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The resource wealth 
burden Ð oil and gas 
sectors in the former
U S S R
Oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life,
life without work, life for free... the concept of oil
expresses perfectly the eternal human dream of we-
alth achieved through lucky accident... In this sense
oil is a fairy tale and like every fairly tale a bit of
a lie.
Ð Ryszard KapuæciÄski, Shah of Shahs
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The former USSR area plays a great role in the in-
ternational oil and gas market. Russia is a real
gas giant, with the richest deposits of this mate-
rial in the world. Russia is also the main expor-
ter of natural gas to many European countries. 
Keeping a strong position in this market remains
a priority for the Russian FederationÕs economic
policy. Europe is a very attractive region because
its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily,
while its own gas production keeps decreasing.
In the long term, the Far East will be an impor-
tant market for Russian exports, too. According
to estimates, demand there will grow even fa-
ster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for
the time being, can not really compete with Rus-
sia in this field, and this status quo will most
probably be preserved in the nearest future. 
The post-Soviet countries also have substantial
oil deposits. Among CIS members, Russia has the
richest oilfields; Kazakhstan comes second, with
large proven deposits of petroleum. In the Eura-
sian market, raw materials coming from the for-
mer USSR area are the major alternative to oil
produced by OPEC countries. Russia does not be-
long to the cartel, and during the last two years,
when international oil prices remained high, it
continued to substantially increase both the pro-
duction levels and exports. 
European countries are the main consumers of
Russian petroleum, yet in the future, Russia may
strengthen its role in such markets as the USA,
Japan and other countries trying to become less
dependent on OPEC oil. A boost in production
and exports by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, co-
untries situated by the Caspian Sea, should also
be expected in the next five years. The signifi-
cance of this region for the international market
is bound to grow when new oil transport routes,
independent of Russia, are opened (see chapter
Export potential of the post-Soviet region).
This collection of papers attempts to give an ac-
curate and clear description of the main charac-
teristics and of the key problems pertaining to
the oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. It is
aimed at showing the wealth and production
and export opportunities on the one hand and at
outlining a number of problems that now limit
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the development of trade in energy materials in
this region and might impede it in the future.
These issues seem to be of particular importan-
ce in the context of the dilemmas facing the Po-
lish and European energy security policy.
This report consists of five studies, focusing on:
the resources and export potential of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States countries,
Russian policy towards the entire oil and gas sec-
tor in the former USSR area and in the countries
of the former Eastern bloc, and the role the ener-
gy resources potential plays in Russian foreign
policy. Also, the studies outline the situation of
the so-called transit countries, i.e. the ones con-
trolling major export pipelines for Russian oil
and gas, discuss the importance of foreign direct
investments for the oil and gas sectors, as well
as the opportunities and dangers that natural re-
source wealth might pose to the development of
CIS countries. In terms of geographic coverage,
the studies pertain to both key oil or gas produ-
cers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan) and the important transit countries
for energy resources from CIS area (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). 
While working on this project, we used the ge-
nerally available literature, statistical yearbooks,
specialist press and agency and internet news
bulletins. We also want to acknowledge the va-
luable comments from CIS countries oil and gas
experts, whom we to talked to while working on
this project. 
Agata üoskot
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Key points
1. The oil and gas sectors are not only among the
most important sections of the economy, but
they are also an important tool in the domestic
and foreign policies of the Russian Federation.
Moscow, through its consistent actions aimed 
at reconstructing a post-Soviet energy area, has 
tightened its control over the energy sectors of
the CIS countries and, above all, over their reso-
urces and transport infrastructure. Russian ener-
gy resources have maintained the dominant po-
sition in the Central and Eastern European mar-
kets and Russia has grasped control over the key
transit routes in this area. Eastern Europe is be-
coming a ÒbridgeheadÓ for Russian companies in
their expansion in the EU market (see chapter
The Russian energy policy).
2. The European former Soviet Union countries
(detailed analysis covers: Belarus, Ukraine, Li-
thuania, Latvia and Estonia) are still largely de-
pendent on supplies of Russian energy mate-
rials. Nevertheless, the degrees of such depen-
dence and its political and economic consequen-
ces are very diverse. The Baltic states are using
their asset of advanced market reforms, while
Belarus and Ukraine play a game with Russia,
where the main stake is control of the transport
routes for Russian oil and gas to the West and
South of Europe (see chapter The oil and gas in
the Òtransit countriesÓ of the former USSR).
3. Energy-rich CIS countries have become the
main beneficiaries of foreign investments in the
region. However, the relatively modest influx of
foreign capital was lower than the needs of the
oil and gas sector. The policy of Kazakh and Aze-
ri authorities, which is quite open to foreign in-
vestments, has contributed to development of
the oil industry in those countries. Limited ac-
cess to the Russian market has in turn resulted
in foreign capital obtaining a much smaller sha-
re in the Russian natural resource sector. The
Russian government monopoly over oil and gas
transportation in the CIS area remains a serious
impediment for new investments (see chapter
Foreign investments in the oil and gas sectors of
CIS energy producers).
4. The natural resource wealth of the former
USSR countries offers a chance for faster deve-
lopment and alleviating poverty, yet the fact of
possessing such wealth complicates the econo-
mic and social policy. Neither the current condi-
tion of the state institutions nor the political si-
tuation in the CIS countries provide grounds for
making too optimistic forecasts for the social
and economic development in this area. Despite
good short-term prospects, there still remains
the risk that some of the resource-rich countries
will not be able to put their natural wealth to
good use (see chapter Oil and gas wealth Ð the
impact on development prospects of CIS coun-
tries). 
Agata üoskot
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Chapter 1. 
Export potential of the
post-Soviet region 
Agata üo s k o t
1. Re s o u r c e s
The post-Soviet area holds large deposits of oil
and the worldÕs l a rgest re s e rves of natural gas1.
The richest raw material base is that of the Ru s-
sian Federation. Russia controls more than 30 per-
c e nt of the worldÕs gas reserves and has large oil
deposits. Another important hydrocarbon-rich
area that emerged after the fall of the USSR is
the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan and Azerba-
ijan are the Caspian oil potentates, while Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan have substantial natu-
ral gas deposits. Even though these countriesÕ
resources are much smaller than those of Russia,
they are a potentially important additional sour-
ce of energy carriers for European and Asian
consumers. 
1.1. Oil
1.1.1. Ru s s i a
Russia has the worldÕs seventh largest oil resour-
ces (after Persian Gulf countries and Venezuela)
with proved deposits exceeding 8 billion tons2
(Table IV). Until early 2002, more than 2 tho-
usand oil and gas-oil fields had been discovered
in the Russian Federation. 85 percent of them are
located in Western Siberia, presently the coun-
tryÕs main raw material base. Western Sibe-
riaÕs resources, though, have already entered the
phase of declining output3. An increase in regio-
nal production in recent years was due to the in-
troduction of modern equipment and extraction
technologies. The remainder of currently explo-
ited resources are located in the Ural Mountains,
in the Transvolga region and in Northern Cauca-
sus Ð Ru s s i a Õ s oldest oil provinces whose depo-
sits are 70Ð90 percent depleted. In 2000, We s t e r n
consortia began producing oil and natural gas in
the Sakhalin Shelf. RussiaÕs oil and gas potential
also includes deposits in Eastern Siberia (Yaku-
tia, Krasnoyarsky Krai and the Irkutsk Oblast)
and in the Arctic Shelf (the Barents and Kara Seas).
These, however, were discovered relatively re c e n-
t l y4, (early 1990s), have been poorly explored and
remain idle. At the moment, approximately 900 of
Ru s s i a Õ s e x p l o red fields remain inactive.
The Russian oil sector, which experienced a dec-
line after the USSR disintegrated, is recovering
quickly now, as oil prices have remained high for
the last several years. The volume of production
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and exports has grown in recent years. In 2002,
RussiaÕs output increased to approx. 380 million
tons5 making the country the worldÕs second lar-
gest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia6. The largest
oil companies are LUKoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegas
and TNK Ð together accounting for over 50 per-
cent of last yearÕs oil production7. The Russian
government forecasts production to grow fur-
ther in the nearest future8.
1.1.2. The Caspian Sea region
The largest oil reserves in the region are those of
Kazakhstan. Proved deposits amount to 1.2 bil-
lion tons9, or below one sixth of the Russian re-
serves. Major Kazakh oil fields are the onshore
Tengiz, Karachaganak and Uzen deposits and the
Kashagan field offshore in the Caspian Sea. Aze-
ri oil resources are estimated at nearly one bil-
lion tons (Table IV)10. The main exploited fields
include Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli. It is belie-
ved that Turkmenistan may possess considera-
ble oil deposits, though they have not been pro-
ved yet.
Output and exports grow rapidly in both Ka z a k h-
stan and Azerbaijan (in intermittent phases Ð
especially in the case of Azerbaijan) as produc-
tion and transportation infrastructure is being
developed. At the moment, these countries pro-
duce 47 and 15 million tons of oil, respectively,
and Kazakhstan exports over 30 million tons (Ta-
ble V). The upward production and export trend
is expected to continue (Diagram 1). According
to forecasts, Kazakh oil production should reach
120 million tons by 201011. It is expected that in
the next decade, countries of the Caspian region
will be able to export approx. 200 million tons of
oil12, the largest exporters being Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
1.2. Natural gas
1.2.1. Ru s s i a
The Russian Federation has the worldÕs largest
reserves of natural gas. P roved deposits amount
to more than 47.5 trillion cubic metres, which
accounts for nearly 1/3 of the global reserves (Ta-
ble IV)13. Gazprom, the Russian monopoly, owns
nearly two thirds of these resources, although
other Russian companies also control increasin-
gly significant fields. RussiaÕs major proved gas
deposits are located in Western Siberia, in the
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area and in the
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area whose depo-
sits are currently being exploited on the largest
scale (they hold more than 80 percent of Russian
gas reserves). 190 gas fields discovered there in-
clude Yamburg, Urengoi and Medvezhye, the
worldÕs largest field. Only some of them are be-
ing exploited, though this is enough to make up
more than 90 percent of Russian output. All We-
stern Siberian fields have entered the phase of
declining output14. Gas is also produced in Rus-
siaÕs oldest production zones, i.e. in the Cauca-
sus and Transvolga regions. However, fields in
these regions are currently depleted in around
90 percent. Finally, the Arctic Shelf, in particular
the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea (the Shtokma-
nov Field, among others), Eastern Siberia (the
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Data of: IEA, www.eia.doe.gov, * Ð estimates
Diagram 1 Ð Oil production in the Caspian Sea region (million tons)
Kovykta field, among others) and the Sakhalin
Shelf add to the production potential. In 2002,
natural gas production increased for the first ti-
me in several years and amounted to 595 billion
cubic metres (Table VII)15. Domestic consumption
remains huge, but still approx. 33 percent of the
annual output is exported. 
According to the International Energy Agency
(IEA), the volume of Russian exports was decre-
asing before 2001 (Table VII). According to Rus-
sian sources, exports have remained relatively
stable owing to internal consumption reduction,
among other measures. The Energy Strategy of
the Russian Federation to 202016 points to the
fact that an increase in the gas output in the
next several years will not be possible unless
Moscow implements fundamental reforms. Sin-
ce internal consumption is projected to grow,
the negative trend may continue. 
1.2.2. The Caspian Sea region
Turkmenistan has the largest natural gas reser-
ves in the Caspian region estimated at more
than 2 trillion cubic metres or approx. 1.3 per-
cent of the worldÕs reserves (Table IV)17. The lar-
gest discovered and exploited gas field is the
giant Dauletabad in southern Turkmenistan. The
country is the single largest gas exporter in Cen-
tral Asia and the sixth largest in the world. Uz-
bekistan controls the second largest gas reserves
in the Caspian region (1.9 trillion cubic metres),
though only small quantities are exported
owing to large domestic consumption. Azerba-
ijan may become another important gas expor-
ter in the region in the coming years. Even tho-
ugh its resources are relatively small (the largest
field is Shah Deniz), the country has chosen to
sell its gas to the West. Finally, Kazakhstan may
also turn out to be an important producer and
exporter of gas, as it is believed to possess sub-
stantial resources (Diagram 2). In the next deca-
de, the Caspian region as a whole may be able to
export approx. 150 billions cubic metres of gas
per year18.
1.3. Eastern Europe Ð oil and gas
Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
remain largely dependent on energy resource
imports from Russia. They have small oil and gas
reserves of their own, but almost all of their out-
put is being used up internally. Ukrainian gas re-
sources cover approx. 1/4 of domestic demand.
Lithuania is the only Baltic State that produces
very small quantities of its own oil in the Baltic
fields. Estonia produces petroleum pro d u c t s
from bituminous shale. In 2001, 75 percent of
domestic energy consumption came from this
source19.
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Data of: IEA, www.eia.doe.gov, * Ð estimates
Diagram 2 Ð Natural gas production in the Caspian Sea region (billion m3)
2. Basic export routes 
( existing and projected) 
A well-developed and efficient system of pipeli-
nes and reloading terminals is necessary to
export energy resources from the former USSR.
The existing network of oil and gas pipelines in
this area has been largely inherited from the
USSR. Export routes from Central Asia end in in-
land Russia, and major Russian pipelines cross
Ukraine and Belarus. This system fails to meet
the export needs of Russia and other CIS energy
producers. Pipeline projects on both sides are at-
tempts at the diversification of transport con-
nections and markets for their products and are
designed to ensure less dependence on transit
through neighbouring countries. 
2.1. Oil
2.1.1. Russian routes
More than ten large oil companies produce oil in
Russia (Attachment 1), but the pipeline network
belongs almost entirely to Transneft, the state-
own monopoly.
Russian oil is transported to Europe mainly thro-
ugh the Druzhba pipeline system. Pipelines from
Western Siberian fields cross central Ru s s i a ,
Eastern and Central Europe to reach western
and southern parts of Europe. One section of the
pipeline system goes to the Baltic States; a route
across Belarus and Poland to Germany and fur-
ther west; a route across Belarus and Ukraine
that forks just before the Slovak border, with one
branch crossing Slovakia and the Czech Republic
to end in Austria, and another ending in Hunga-
ry and the Balkans (Map 1). In 2002, Russia di-
spatched approx. 57 million tons of oil through
the Druzhba system, which accounted for 44
percent of its total oil exports20.
There are plans to make the Druzhba system mo-
re efficient and increase its capacity by integra-
ting the Croatian Adria Pipeline into it. As a re-
sult, Russian resources could then be transpor-
ted to the Balkans in larger quantities and fur-
ther re-exported from the Adriatic port of Omi-
salj (e.g. to the US). Another option discussed by
some sources is to use the newly built OdessaÐ
ÐBrody pipeline in Ukraine, originally intended
to reach P¸ock and GdaÄsk, for the exports of
Russian oil21. As the output of Western Siberian
fields decreases, other, less intensively operated
reserves gain importance, for example the Rus-
sian section of the Caspian Shelf. Oil from this
area will be transported together with Kazakh
oil along the CPC TengizÐNovorossiysk route
launched in late 2001. 
Russia also sends its oil to Western markets by
sea: across the Baltic (over 24 million tons, i.e. 19
percent) and the Black Sea (47 million tons, i.e.
36 percent of total oil exports)22. Recently, Russia
has tended to export less and less oil through
terminals in the former Soviet republics, thus re-
ducing its dependence on transit through neigh-
bouring countries. Pipelines within Russian ter-
ritory (the Baltic Pipeline System) supply oil to
the Baltic ports of Primorsk and St. Petersburg,
to Ventspils in Latvia23 and to other harbours.
From there, Russian oil is dispatched to Northern
Europe. Oil is shipped from Russian Black Sea
terminals (Novorossiysk, Tuapse) and the Ukra-
inian facility in Odessa reaching Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, and Turkey and further to the south of the
continent (Map 1).
Oil is also exported from Russia by rail24. Even
though the quantities dispatched in this way are
small, this mode of transport is worth mentio-
ning for two reasons. Firstly, the volume of
exports sent by rail may be increased25. Secondly,
oil exported by rail is usually not included in na-
tional statistics; hence it is theoretically possible
to evade certain limits or obligations.
In the nearest future, building new routes to Eu-
ropean markets and modernisation of existing
ones will become a priority for Russian energy
commodity sector. At the same time, though,
new destinations are seen as increasingly impor-
tant. Hence, on the one hand, the terminal in
Primorsk is being extended and its capacity in-
creased, along with the whole infrastructure (pi-
pelines delivering oil to Primorsk and oil tanks),
and ever more specific plans are made to incor-
porate Ukrainian (OdessaÐBrody) or Balkan (Ad-
ria) routes into the system. On the other hand,
there is more and more talk about the construc-
tion of new terminals, including one in Mur-
mansk on the Barents Sea, and new export ro-
utes, mainly to Asian markets, including China
and Japan in particular (the AngarskÐDacin and
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AngarskÐNakhodka pipelines, respectively Ð see
Map 1).
2.1.2. The Caspian routes
The Caspian oil reserves are situated far from at-
tractive markets, and export of Caspian oil rema-
ins dependent on the existing transport systems
of neighbouring countries (mainly Russia), who-
se current capacity fails to match the re g i o nÕ s po-
tential. Russia and other CIS countries remain
the chief consumers of Caspian oil, though some
quantities are also sold to European markets.
Practically all export routes for Central Asian oil
which are mostly post-Soviet facilities cross the
Russian territory. Even though governments of
major countries involved in the region and oil
companies operating there have been conten-
ding with one another for twelve years now to
build alternative transport routes, the only ma-
jor project that has actually been implemented
is the Caspian Pipeline ConsortiumÕs (CPC) 
TengizÐNovorossiysk route with a capacity of 30
million tons. It has been co-financed by the Ru s-
sian Federation and crosses the Russian territory.
The second major existing export pipeline that
is especially important for Kazakhstan is the
AtyrauÐSamara route that ends in inland Russia
(15 million ton capacity). 
Existing Azeri oil pipelines are much smaller
than those of Kazakhstan. The most important
ones include the BakuÐSupsa pipeline built by
a BP-led Western consortium, which bypasses
Russia (7 million tons), and the BakuÐNovoros-
siysk pipeline that ends in a Russian terminal 
(5 million tons).
The development of new export routes is closely
connected with the growing production of oil.
From among all projects intended to expand the
Caspian export infrastructure, the pipeline from
AzerbaijanÕs Baku across Georgia to Ceyhan, the
Turkish port on the Mediterranean (BTC), is the
closest to being complete. The pipeline, to be
launched in 2004, will have the capacity of 50
million tons a year. It will be the first major pi-
peline in the Caspian region that bypasses the
territory of Russia. It is being built by an inter-
national consortium supported by the US admi-
nistration, and is intended to transport Azeri oil
to European markets. In future it may also trans-
port Kazakh oil, if the underwater AktauÐBaku
section is built. There are a few parallel plans to
build new pipelines for Kazakh oil. Projects of
connections to China, Iran and India are being
considered. Kazakhstan is also going to expand
the existing post-Soviet AtyrauÐSamara pipeline
doubling its capacity.
2.2. Gas transport infrastructure
2.2.1. The Russian routes
Russian gas exports are controlled entirely by
Gazprom which owns the entire pipeline ne-
twork. Most of the major gas export routes start
in the Tyumen region. There are plans to develop
deposits in, and build new pipelines from the
Yamal Peninsula, but implementation of these
plans has been systematically postponed as yet.
Gas is transported to Europe via three main ro-
utes. The most important one is the system of
major gas pipelines including Bratstvo (Brother-
hood) and others. It crosses Ukraine and Slova-
kia, and then splits into two branches, one of
which reaches Hungary and Austria, and the
other the Czech Republic and Germany. It trans-
ports more than 100 trillion cubic metres of gas
a year. The second route is the YamalÐ Western
E u rope pipeline (the Yamal gas pipeline). It
starts in Western Siberia and crosses Belarus and
Poland to end in Germany and its current capa-
city is 20 trillion cubic metres. The third major
connection crosses Ukraine, Romania and Bulga-
ria to reach the Balkans and Turkey. Its capacity
is similar to that of the Yamal pipeline. In order
to reduce the load on this route and make itself
less dependent on transit countries, Gazprom
has built the Blue Stream pipeline in co-opera-
tion with ENI of Italy. The Blue Stream runs un-
der the Black Sea and connects southern Russia
directly with Turkey. Other important pipelines
include the ones to the Baltic States and Finland
and the pipeline exporting gas to countries of
the Southern Caucasus. 
GazpromÕs new top priority project, the trans-
-Baltic pipeline, which is to run across the Baltic
sea floor, is intended to connect Russia directly
with Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia. 
It is modelled on the Blue Stream launched in
2003. This new connection will make Russia less
dependent on transit through territories of third
countries, notably Ukraine, and will further
postpone the construction of the Yamal pipeli-
n e Õ s second line across Belarus and Poland. 
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At the moment, Gazprom cannot afford to carry
out the trans-Baltic project, though. The Russian
monopoly also has plans to increase the capaci-
ty of the most important existing connections
and, in the longer term, to build pipelines to Chi-
na and Japan. 
2.2.2. The Caspian routes
At the moment, the post-Soviet system of pipeli-
nes crossing Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan which is
also connected to the major Russian pipelines
(the Central Asia Ð C e n t re and the Bukhara Ð U r a l
pipelines) remains the basic route for the sale of
gas produced in the Caspian region, notably in
Turkmenistan. The present capacity of these pipe-
lines is 50 trillion cubic metres a y e a r. They trans-
port Turkmen gas to Russia and Ukraine. The only
new export connection is the small pipeline to
Iran (target capacity of 13 trillion cubic metre s )
launched in the second half of the 1990s. Finally,
t h e re is the regional network of Central Asian gas
pipelines connecting Uzbekistan with Ta j i k i s t a n ,
Ky rgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan which pro-
vide gas to areas without own deposits.
There is a pipeline linking Southern Caucasus
with Russia though at the moment there is no
infrastructure that could be used for gas exports
from the region. Azerbaijan has a small gas con-
nection to Iran, but it has remained idle for ma-
ny years. 
The undeveloped gas wealth of the Caspian Sea
region, and especially that of Turkmenistan, has
attracted the attention of Eurasian gas impor-
ters from Europe as well as Pakistan, India and
China, and transit countries such as Iran, Afgha-
nistan and, first and foremost, Russia. The Rus-
sian-Turkmen gas contract signed in April 2003
provides for development of the transport infra-
structure connecting the two countries. Another
gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan and the
Russian Federation is to be built soon. In future,
it may be extended into Ukraine. There is also
a competing project that has been promoted for
some time by the Turkmen President to build
a trans-Afghan pipeline (TurkmenistanÐAfghani-
stanÐPakistan). The Asian Development Bank is
engaged in this project together with those co-
untries that are directly involved. 
Works seem to be most advanced on the Baku-
T b i l i s i Ð E r z u rum (BTE) route from Azerbaijan
across Georgia to Turkey. A consortium led by
British Petroleum (BP) and backed by the United
States is building this pipeline. BTE is to be laun-
ched in 2006. 
3. The regionÕs export potential
and its limitations 
Only a fraction of the huge export potential of
the post-Soviet area is being utilised. The region
is capable of increasing its oil and gas produc-
tion as well as its exports. This is very important
for the consumers of Russian energy resources.
The demand for gas and oil in territories neigh-
bouring the former USSR is increasing. This ten-
dency is apparent not only in the traditional
markets for Russian gas and oil, but also in East
and Southeast Asia. The Old Continent, the ma-
jor importer of Russian energy raw materials, is
gradually running out of its own resources. Me-
anwhile, natural gas, of which Russia is the
worldÕs largest producer, is becoming an incre-
asingly important and sought-after fuel, espe-
cially in developed countries that are striving to
reduce their oil and coal consumption to protect
the environment.
There are many reasons why the export poten-
tial of the post-Soviet region is profited from on
a much smaller scale than it could be. Following
the break-up of the USSR, the Russian oil and gas
sector slipped into a crisis. On the one hand, di-
sintegration of the Soviet production, distribu-
tion, processing and sale system led to a drop in
output. On the other, the system of economic,
infrastructural and other ties inherited from the
USSR proved so strong that in many cases it still
restricts or determines the direction of change in
the oil and gas sectors of the newly independent
states.
It was only in 1999, after ten years of decline,
that oil production in Russia began to grow, re-
aching 380 million tons by 200226. Gas produc-
tion volume experienced a relatively small decre-
ase, however exports declined. Gas contracts
concluded with European countries were (and
still are) performed at the expense of supplies to
countries of the CIS27. After 1990, the capacity
utilisation of Russian oil refineries also decre-
ased. According to the Russian Energy Ministry,
it is now below 70 percent in the whole country.
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One of the reasons for these declines is degene-
ration and poor technical condition of the oil
and gas infrastructure.
3.1. Re s e rv e s
3.1.1. Ru s s i a
RussiaÕs raw material base is deteriorating, both
in terms of quantity and quality, as the propor-
tion of resources that are expensive to operate
and difficult to access is increasing28. This is one
of the most serious problems faced by the Rus-
sian oil and gas sector. After more than 40 years
of wasteful exploitation of the Western Siberian
reserves, those fields are now degraded. Primiti-
ve technologies, the retrieval of surface resour-
ces only, and the closing down of partly depleted
wells has caused an environmental disaster and
loss of nearly 40 percent of resources. The syste-
matic decrease in production was exacerbated in
the 1990s by a considerable reduction of spen-
ding on geological research and deep drills. 
Launching the operation of new fields in the un-
developed and insufficiently explored regions of
Eastern Siberia and the Arctic Shelf will require
colossal funding. Without foreign investments,
the Russian Federation will be able to keep its oil
production at the current level for a maximum
of 10 years. Then, production will drop dramati-
cally29. Gas production in Russia began to incre-
ase only last year, following four years of decli-
ne30. While gas exports dropped relatively little
(to 200131), this was due to reducing the volume
of supplies to the internal market and the CIS
markets (Table VII). Since 1999, the Russian mar-
ket has been experiencing a gas deficit32.
3.1.2. The Caspian deposits
The Caspian region has some of the worldÕs ol-
dest discovered hydrocarbon deposits. Even tho-
ugh they have been largely depleted today (Azer-
baijan, the Russian section of the Caspian Sea
shelf), the Caspian region also has areas that ha-
ve not been fully explored in terms of the size of
their raw materials base (Kazakhstan, Turkmeni-
stan). The Caspian Shelf holds the largest oil de-
posits discovered in recent decades, e.g. the
giant Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan, and po-
tentially large gas deposits in Turkmenistan.
Most deposits in the Caucasus and Central Asia
that used to be exploited by the Soviet Union are
presently under-utilised as a result of infrastruc-
ture degradation and loosening of economic and
transport ties between the region and its former
metropolis. Output and export levels are lower
even than in Soviet times. The newly discovered
fields have not reached their peak productivity
yet (Tengiz) and some of them are not being ope-
rated at all or are being used solely for local pur-
poses (Karachaganak). This is so because of the
absence of proper production infrastructure and
export connections, and frequently also because
of an unfavourable investment climate. In some
countries, e.g. in Turkmenistan, formal barriers
exist that impede the search for and exploration
of new deposits33.
3.2. Infrastructure
The post-Soviet production and transmission in-
frastructure, which used to form one system
spanning the entire USSR, is currently unable to
fully meet the regionÕs export requirements.
New borders have emerged, the infrastructure
has been divided between different countries,
the nature and intensity of economic and politi-
cal contacts between Moscow and the former re-
publics have changed, and most countries of the
CIS are experiencing crises and economic trans-
formations. As a result, the post-Soviet system of
oil and gas pipelines is in need of modernisation
and reconstruction. Major pipelines throughout
the former Soviet area are gradually degrading
and their capacity decreases because of insuffi-
cient domestic investments due to a shortage of
funds, the absence of foreign investments and
an unfavourable investment climate. 
Construction of the Russian pipeline system be-
gan in the late 1960s and early 70s. At the mo-
ment, the total capacity of this system is lower
than it was originally, and the system itself is be-
ing used differently Ð before the USSR broke up,
the Union republics received (and needed) larger
amounts of resources than the CIS countries do
now. Back in Soviet times, Transneft pipelines
transported approx. 600 million tons of oil
a year, now this volume dropped by two thirds34.
Domestic demand and transport volumes have
decreased the most, but major export pipelines
are overloaded. In 2002, capacity utilisation of
the system transporting oil beyond the CIS area
was at around 85 percent, and in 2003 this per-
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centage is projected to be even higher35. Gene-
r a l l y, Tr a n s n e f t Õ s pipelines transport approx. 
99 percent of Russian oil output to domestic con-
sumers, the CIS countries and European mar-
kets. In addition, Transneft also provides its se-
rvices to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, where
transport needs are bound to grow. Hence it is
n e c e s s a ry to increase the systemÕs c a p a c i t y. 
Meanwhile, the wear of TransneftÕs network
exceeds 70 percent36. In addition to technical de-
gradation caused by exceeding the projected 
life-time of the pipelines, inadequate construc-
tion technologies and poor quality of pipes used
in construction are behind the deterioration. 
According to Russian experts, in order to keep
the pipeline system in working condition annual
investments of US$ 120Ð130 million will be ne-
cessary over the next several years37.
Conveyance capacity of gas pipelines is also dec-
lining. The Central AsiaÐCentre and BukharaÐ
ÐUral pipelines connecting Central Asia with
Russia could once transport 100 billion cubic
metres of gas annually, but nowadays capacity
has dropped to approx. 50 billion cubic metres.
According to Alexander Ryazanov, GazpromÕs de-
puty CEO, the conveyance capacity deficit of the
Russian gas pipeline network may reach 100 bil-
lion cubic metres as soon as 2010. Expanding
this capacity will require US$ 15Ð20 billion in in-
vestments. Ryazanov believes it is necessary to
increase private (non-Gazprom) investments in
the gas infrastructure. However, while Gazprom
remains a monopoly in terms of transport ne-
twork ownership, independent gas producers
are reluctant to make such investments.
3.3. Political conditions
Changes taking place in regional and global poli-
tics also have a substantial impact on the dimini-
shing role of old, post-Soviet transport routes and
the development of plans to build new ones. The
e m e rgence of new states in the former USSR are a ,
especially the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian re-
publics, has attracted the attention of world po-
wers and afforded the region an opportunity to
enter new markets in the west (Turkey and oth-
ers), east (China, Japan) and south (India, Afgha-
nistan). In order to take advantage of this oppor-
tunity it is necessary to build new export con-
nections, and this is precisely the stake of the
ÒGreat GameÓ over the Caspian region that has
continued for twelve years now. Today, Russia re-
mains the chief transit area for Caspian energy
resources. Since the break-up of the USSR, only
small and insignificant export pipelines have be-
en built outside its territory. MoscowÕs policy to-
wards the region has successfully thwarted im-
plementation of alternative projects. Exports
through the Russian networks are regulated ba-
sed on non-transparent criteria and subordina-
ted to the stateÕs strategy to preserve the mono-
poly on transport and exports. This can make it
difficult to access the Transneft system for both
domestic and foreign producers. Special inter-
governmental agreements are needed for a third
country to be able to transport its energy resour-
ces through Russia. Since Russia has not ratified
the Energy Charter Agreement as yet38, it conti-
nues to possess a fairly efficient tool, namely the
ability to block a countryÕs exports/transit in ca-
se of dispute39. This makes the situation espe-
cially complicated for Central Asian producers
who are nearly 100 percent dependent on the
Russian system of export pipelines.
Underutilisation of the post-Soviet areaÕs export
potential is also due to the rather unfavourable
investment climate in the region40 that stems
from the internal economic and political situ-
ation of particular countries. Export plans of the
Russian Federation are impeded by the situation
in its internal market. The oil and gas sector sub-
sidises other branches of the economy and non-
productive sectors, and sustains the energy-in-
tensive industry. Growing gas consumption in
the Russian market, the absence of much-needed
reforms, low prices of energy carriers and decre-
asing production Ð all of these pose a serious
threat and a challenge for the Kremlin. The chan-
ges needed to transform the economy and incre-
ase the volume of exports will not take place
unless in-depth reforms are implemented. The-
se, however, may cause serious social trouble in
the country. For this reason, no reforms should
be expected before the 2004 presidential elec-
tions41.
Similarly, the struggle over the succession of
Heydar Aliev might shake the internal situation
in Azerbaijan, which has remained relatively sta-
ble for now. It is potentially possible, though
hardly likely, that someone not connected with
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the present ruling elite could rise to power. This
would inevitably shake the entire system in
which members or affiliates of the Aliev clan oc-
cupy all senior positions in the country and in
the oil and gas sector.
As a result, throughout the former USSR area:
Ð the inefficient (economic) ties and relations in-
herited from the USSR are consolidating and im-
pede internal economic reforms (in Russia);
Ð CIS countries that import energy raw materials
face limited possibilities of diversifying their
supplies;
Ð CIS countries that produce oil and gas face li-
mited access to Western markets;
Ð supplies of raw materials from the region and
investments in the CIS are subject to a constant
or increasingly high risk.
The negative consequences of these trends in
the post-Soviet areaÕs oil and gas sectors affect
energy resource producers and consumers alike.
While the former face barriers that impede in-
creasing production and exports, the latter are
concerned about long-term stability and securi-
ty of oil and gas supplies.
Nevertheless, both sides desire to overcome the
obstacles and to establish a stable framework for
c o-operation. The Russian government has been
calling for a reform of the gas sector for several
years, though in vain so far. Such a reform would
have to be co-o rdinated with the entire Ru s s i a n
economic strategy aiming to modernise the Ru s-
sian economy. European countries call on Ru s s i a
to reform its energy sector. European pro p o s a l s
pertain mainly to the formation of a t r a n s p a re n t
formal and legal framework for investment pro-
jects and ratification of international agre e m e n t s
regulating the transit of energy carriers. In 2000,
the European Union and Russia began their ener-
gy dialogue. So far, however, its only result has
been the formulation of a list of the often contra-
d i c t o ry interests of the two sides4 2.
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Chapter 2. 
The Russian energy policy
Ewa Pa s z y c
1. Objectives of the oil 
and gas policy 
The export policy of the Russian Federation is an
important element in the stateÕs strategy explici-
tly formulated by President Vladimir Putin. The
K re m l i nÕ s strategic goal is to establish the coun-
t ry as an economic power, a position that will
enable Russia to regain its place in the internatio-
nal scene and consolidate or even stre n g t h e n
M o s c o w Õ s influence there1. The natural re s o u rc e
deposits and the fuel industry are Ru s s i a Õ s m o s t
powerful and most profitable instrument of eco-
nomic influence. Fo reign expansion of Ru s s i a n
companies may be intended to multiply pro f i t s ,
but at the same time it is in line with the sta-
t e Õ s s t r a t e g y. Russian capital expands mainly into
a reas that Moscow considers to be the domain of
its vital political and economic intere s t s . The de-
gree and scope of this expansion largely depends
on the character of ties existing between parti-
cular regions or countries on the one hand, and
Russia and its fuel industry on the other.
1.1. Oil and gas relations between
Russia and the former USSR region.
Transport monopoly 
and control of energy resources 
Russian fuel companies are still most active in
expanding their operations in the former Soviet
republics, i.e. countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States and the Baltic States. In the
CIS area Russia is not only the largest producer
of oil and natural gas. Also, it holds a monopoly
on the transport of hydrocarbons produced by
the former republics, and is the sole supplier of
energy resources to those countries that have
none of their own. 
The network of gas and oil pipelines inherited
from the USSR guarantees RussiaÕs exclusive po-
sition in terms of the transit of hydrocarbons
produced by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerba-
ijan and Kazakhstan. This situation profits Mo-
scow in at least three ways. Firstly, it enables
Russia to control the gas and oil sectors of these
countries (especially their energy re s o u rc e
exports). Secondly, it supplements any gas shor-
tages that Gazprom may experience, enabling it
to meet its obligations under foreign contracts
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and domestic supplies. Finally, it generates pro-
ceeds from transport services. 
The transport monopoly is also an efficient tool
to keep the CIS within the span of Ru s s i a Õ s i n f l u-
ence. Moscow is determined to keep this situ-
ation unchanged, as the governmentÕs re a c t i o n
to the protest of influential oil companies concer-
ning the transit of Kazakh oil has demonstrated.
The Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov di-
smissed it by saying: ÒTransit is a matter of state
strategy and is not subject to debateÓ2. For the
same reason Russia has attempted, to thwart
p rojects of pipelines bypassing its territory3. 
The relations with those former republics that
depend on Russian oil and gas supplies are less
p rofitable in financial terms. The nearly absolute
dependence of these countries affords Russia cer-
tain benefits, e.g. by enabling it to influence the
republicsÕ policies. In addition, it helps Russia in
attempts to take over control of the oil and gas
pipelines of these republics (Belarus and Ukraine
in the first place), which Russia uses to export its
commodities to Central and Western Euro p e .
Russia is also able to take advantage of the chro-
nic energy debt of some of the CIS countries to
t a ke over businesses, especially local gas and oil
i n f r a s t ru c t u re operators, processing plants (re f i-
neries), power plants etc, at a low cost.
1.2. Central Europe and the Balkans. 
Keeping the region dependent on
Russian supplies and efforts to gain
direct access to the EU market 
Until re c e n t l y, Central and Eastern European coun-
tries were almost completely dependent on oil and
gas imports from Russia. This dependence dated
back to the times of the USSR. It had formed due to
two basic factors: the existence of the Druzhba oil
pipelines and a gas pipelines system that tied these
countries to the sole Soviet supplier, and the pre f e-
rential prices offered at the time to satellite coun-
tries. Political changes in the region that followed
the break-up of the USSR altered that situation of
dependency to a v e ry small extent.
Presently, the main objective of the Russian oil
and gas policy in the former socialist countries is
to keep control of those transit connections in
the region that are of crucial importance for Rus-
sian exports (mainly pipelines in Slovakia, Bulga-
ria and Romania), and to retain the position of
the largest (or exclusive) supplier of oil, petro-
leum products and gas in these markets. 
Potentially, it is the Òoil tiesÓ that could have lo-
osened to the greatest extent. Most Central Eu-
ropean countries can theoretically import oil
from other sources. This ability may be restric-
ted by the transport situation (e.g. the absence
of on-shore oil terminals and the ÒattachmentÓ
to the post-Soviet pipeline system) or economic
and technological restraints (refineries adapted
to the heavy Russian oil). In practice, markets of
most of these countries are still dominated by
Russian oil for various reasons (Diagram 1).
The gas markets of Central European countries
continue to depend on imports from Ru s s i a4. This
is due to several factors. Firstly, gas supplies are
about a ÒrigidÓ connection between pro d u c e r s
and consumers through gas pipeline networks.
Countries of Central Europe have no such con-
nections to exporters other than Gazprom. Se-
c o n d l y, Russian gas is cheaper than gas pro v i d e d
by other suppliers; e.g. it is nearly 15 perc e n t
cheaper than Norwegian gas. Third l y, a system of
long-term contracts guarantees the Russian mo-
nopoly an exclusive position in terms of supplies
to the former satellite countries. Finally, the still
influential Gazprom lobbies present in those co-
untries have effectively obstructed projects to al-
low alternative suppliers of the blue fuel. Such al-
ternative suppliers and competition, be it mere l y
potential, could alleviate the negative consequ-
ences of Gazpro m Õ s status as a monopoly in the
gas markets of Central European countries, by al-
lowing them to negotiate more efficiently aga-
inst gas and transit prices imposed by the mono-
poly or unfavourable contract terms.
From the point of view of the Russian state and
its businesses, Central Europe and the Balkans
are in many respects a natural and interesting
area of expansion. First and foremost, they are
situated in the proximity of Russia and along di-
rect routes of energy resource exports to We-
stern and Southern Europe. In addition, they ha-
ve large and developing fuel markets. A domi-
nant position in these markets is a kind of gu-
arantee of profits, especially since fuel prices are
higher there than in Russia and the CIS.
Another advantage offered by the Central Euro-
pean countries is the prospect of their EU mem-
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bership. Investment plans of Russian businesses
in the region include participation in the privati-
sation of raw-material processing plants. By lo-
cating the production of fuels and petrochemical
plants in the new Member States, close to the
Western end-consumers and within the EU cu-
stoms area, Russian companies may be able to
multiply their profits.
1.3. Western Europe. Direct presence
and increasing the share of Ru s s i a n
resources in the EU market
The most important goal of the oil and gas po-
licy of Russia is to be directly and strongly pre-
sent in its largest and most profitable market,
the EU. The situation of Russian companies in
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Data of: Oil Information 2003, IEA
Diagram 1 Ð Dependence of OECD states on oil imports from the former USSR region
Diagram 2 Ð Dependence of European countries on natural gas imports from Russia
Data of: Natural Gas Information 2003, IEA
the EU is made difficult by the fact that its oil
market is diversified and basically divided
among western concerns that import oil from
different sources. The oil trading system based
on short-term contracts and transactions offers
oil consumers the ability to choose and change
their suppliers. The western oil-processing sec-
tor is practically beyond the reach of Russian
oil companies.
The situation in the Western European gas mar-
ket is completely different. Russian gas occupies
a strong position there, despite the presence of
other competing producers of the blue fuel, no-
tably Norway and Algeria. In 2001, Russian gas
accounted for more than 20 percent of the We-
stern European gas market and its share is bo-
und to increase as the own resources of Europe-
an countries (mainly Great Britain, Denmark, the
Netherlands and, in the longer term, also Nor-
way) become depleted. Gazprom hopes to incre-
ase its exports to Europe also because gas con-
sumption in the EU countries is forecast to grow.
Ac c o rding to EU commissioners, the Euro p e a n
Union is pre p a red even to double the volume of
its gas imports from Ru s s i a5. Experts believe that
by 2020, countries of the enlarged Euro p e a n
Union will import approx. 70 percent of their gas
consumption (in 2002 Ð 40 percent). Gazprom re-
ports indicate that under contracts already held
by the concern, exports to Western Europe could
i n c rease by 60 percent by 20106. There is only one
factor that could realistically limit the growth of
the volume of Russian gas supplies to the Euro p e-
an market, namely production constraints of Gaz-
p rom in the event of a Ò g a s e m a n c i p a t i o nÓ of Cen-
tral Asian countries. Developing new deposits in
the Russian Arctic shelf is bound to be expensive
and will inevitably drive production prices up.
Still, for the time being the possibility of pro d u c-
tion shortages remains theore t i c a l .
Because of the strong position of Gazprom in the
Western European market, Russian politicians
and representatives of the gas monopoly do not
bother to avoid in their public speeches more or
less veiled threats. For example, they reminded
the UE that in addition to Europe, Russia has
other, equally interesting directions of exports,
notably China and the region of Southeast Asia,
as well as the US7.
Despite this rhetoric, Gazprom is taking measu-
res to enter new markets in Western Europe. To
this end, the President and the government of
the Russian Federation support the monopo-
lyÕs campaign to build a trans-Baltic gas pipeline
to transport Russian gas directly to Germany,
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Scandinavia.
The construction of such a major gas pipeline
would put an end to all other projects to build
gas pipelines across the Baltic Sea8.
1.4. Expanding presence in oil and
gas markets of other regions (Asia). 
Search for new markets
Fierce competition in the European oil market
spurs Russian companies to seek new markets.
The Asian market offers especially good pro-
spects for RussiaÕs export ambitions. According
to long-term forecasts, the potential of the Chi-
nese gas market will be comparable to, or even
greater than the potential of the European mar-
ket already by 2020. Hence the plans to expand
export activities in Asia9.
It is mainly China that offers a secure and deve-
loping market for energy carriers. Analysts esti-
mate that by 2020, the deficit of energy resour-
ces in China may reach 200 million tons of oil
equivalent10. The markets of other Far Eastern
countries, notably Japan and South Korea, are al-
so growing and promise good profits. No won-
der that the Energy Strategy of the Russian Fede-
ration to 2020 defines the construction of an oil
pipeline from Russia to the markets in Asia as
one of the top priorities11, especially since the fu-
ture partners are ready to co-finance such an in-
vestment. The Chinese gas market also offers po-
tentially good prospects, but the West-East pro-
ject in which Gazprom takes part remains in the
phase of preliminary agreements12.
The Asian market is important for Russia for two
other reasons. Firstly, if the export plans are to
be implemented, the untouched resources of
Eastern Siberia will have to be explored and de-
veloped, leading to an economic activation of
the region. Secondly, Asia is treated as a poten-
tial partner in the creation of a multipolar world
in RussiaÕs foreign strategy to counterbalance
the unipolar Pax Americana.
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2. Instruments of the Ru s s i a n
energy policy in Europe 
and the CIS 
In its export strategy, Moscow resorts to diffe-
rent measures and methods. All of them serve to
develop the three basic tools for optimisation of
the Russian policy:
Ð a sustained transport monopoly (CIS) or con-
trol of energy resource transport / transit corri-
dors (the Baltic States, Central Europe, and the
Balkans);
Ð retained control of resources (production and
exports of oil and gas) in RussiaÕs zone of influ-
ence (mainly the CIS);
Ð development of own processing capacity (CIS
and the former socialist countries) and sales ne-
tworks. 
2.1. Control of energy raw materials
transport, transit and resources 
Controlling the energy resources transport and
transit connections is of fundamental importan-
ce for MoscowÕs export strategy. The transit mo-
nopoly enables Russia to control the energy raw
material resources and exports of the former re-
publics. Presently, the Russian Federation con-
trols nearly all gas transit routes throughout the
post-Soviet area of influence. At the same time,
as the largest oil producer and the main transit
corridor for oil produced in the CIS area, Russia
controls a large segment of the CIS oil export in-
frastructure. The activity of Russian companies
in the Baltic States and further abroad clearly
proves that one of the objectives of their expan-
sion is to gain control of those sections of Euro-
pean oil pipelines and oil terminals in the former
USSR area and in some Central European coun-
tries which are important in terms of transit13.
The Russian gas monopoly seems to be the most
successful in building a transport control sys-
tem. Until recently, Gazprom was rather unscru-
pulous in its choice of measures14. The less seve-
re methods include, for example, the cutting off
of gas supplies (e.g. to Bulgaria, Georgia or Ar-
menia) or driving local companies into debt and
then trying to take them over as repayment of
dues15. Presently, gas blackmail (suspending of
supplies) is used almost exclusively in relation to
insolvent contractors in the CIS. In the remain-
der of the post-Soviet area of influence, Gazprom
uses more civilised methods and a proven plan
of action. The company establishes a holding or
joint venture with a local gas pipeline operator
creating a transit monopoly for Russian gas
(such a joint venture is usually an import mono-
poly as well). Then it gradually exploits formal
measures (certain provisions in company artic-
les, terms of gas contracts, etc) and non-formal
means (personal connections, pro-Gazprom lob-
bies) to gain the deciding vote. 
RussiaÕs strategic objective of optimising the
blue fuel transport to Western markets is also
pursued through projects to build new direct
export pipelines, some of which are planned,
and some already being implemented by the mo-
nopoly. Such projects are intended to eliminate
transit through third countries (the trans-Baltic
gas pipeline and the Blue Stream). 
Because of the characteristics of the oil market,
its higher degree of liberalisation and the fierce
competition of powerful Western companies,
Russia has been much less successful in control-
ling the transit of oil than it was in the case of
gas transit. Nevertheless, Russia and the Russian
companies continue to take some measures to
this end. They aim to acquire interests in compa-
nies operating local oil infrastructures and thus
control the most important sections of major Eu-
ropean oil pipelines. RussiaÕs determination and
the methods to which it resorts depend on the
significance of the given company for Russian
exports and the character of connections with
the given country.
2.1.1. CIS and the Baltic States
Most oil and gas pipelines in the CIS area have
been inherited from the USSR. After its break-up,
the Russian Federation got only a portion of the
infrastructure. The very significant remainder,
including the Baltic terminals and main oil and
gas export routes (in Ukraine and Belaru s ) ,
which are of crucial importance for Russia, en-
ded up beyond the borders of the Russian Fede-
ration. Hence, already in the 1990s it became
a top priority of the Russian policy to restore
a uniform transport system within the CIS. To
this end, it was necessary to strike deals with
the former republics in whose territories the pi-
pelines and terminals had ended up. What made
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this task easier was the fact that nearly all
export routes for CIS-produced hydrocarbons
crossed Russia and there still existed strong ties
between the former republics, their economies
and their elite on the one hand, and the former
metropolis on the other. Reconstruction of the
post-Soviet transport network is advanced but
not complete. 
Under long-term deals concluded in 2002Ð2003
with gas producing countries (Kazakhstan, Uz-
bekistan and Turkmenistan), Gazprom presently
controls the transport of gas from Central Asia.
Efforts to establish gas consortia with major
transit countries, notably with Ukraine, have be-
en less successful. The Russian monopoly also
has difficulties establishing a gas infrastructure
management company in Belarus. However, the
country is almost completely dependent on Rus-
sian gas supplies and has a huge gas debt, which
is likely to eventually force Minsk to enter the
consortium.
As regards oil, the Baltic ports, especially the lar-
gest one Ð Ventspils in Latvia Ð are of crucial im-
portance for Russia in terms of transit. Attempts
made by RussiaÕs Transneft to buy a controlling
stake in this terminal have failed so far. Russia
hopes to solve this problem and procure the out-
come it desires using an oil blockade Ð one of the
severe methods to which Moscow resorts only if
the installation it wants is of strategic importan-
ce to the state or to Russian companies, and
plans to privatise it run counter to RussiaÕs inte-
rests. 
2.1.2. Central Europe and the Balkans
Another important objective of Ru s s i a Õ s has been
to gain control of those transit connections in for-
mer socialist countries, which are particularly im-
portant to Russian gas exports. At the moment,
Russia has de facto control of all gas transport ro-
utes in this area. Gas pipelines in Central Euro p e
and the Balkans are operated by companies in
which Gazprom holds minority blocks of share s
or 50-percent blocks as a maximum (Table I). Ho-
wever, owing to the provisions of these compa-
niesÕ articles and the Òfriendly attitudesÓ of local
lobbies whose representatives sit on these com-
paniesÕ boards, the Russian monopoly always
has the deciding vote. This allows Gazprom to
dictate the terms and prices of transit and reta-
in its status as a monopoly in these markets16.
Controlling the system of oil transport in Central
Europe is a more complicated matter. Many co-
untries in the region possess infrastructures
that allow them to be independent of Russian
supplies17. RussiaÕs goal is to continue domina-
ting the oil markets of Central Europe and to ma-
ximise exports. Hence, the country endeavours
to gain control of those sections of the infra-
structure that enable diversification of supplies
and, at the same time, may increase the export
capabilities of Russian concerns. Russian oil
companies in Central Europe participate in pri-
vatisation tenders to acquire shares in operators
or shareholders of local oil infrastructures that
are important from the point of view of supplies
diversification. Frequently, winning such tenders
also offers a chance to control additional export
channels18.
2.1.3. Western Europe
Gaining control of the major Western European
oil and gas transport routes leading to the lar-
gest oil and gas consumers is beyond the reach
of Russia. Besides, Moscow does not have such
ambitions anyway. Legislation presently in force
in France and Italy, GazpromÕs major contrac-
tors, makes it practically impossible for any
competitors to sneak into their internal markets.
One of the very few gaps in the tight protection
of the Western gas infrastructure system is the
German anti-monopoly legislation. 
In future, though, liberalisation of the EU gas
market will ensure that all producers have equal
access to the transport networks. Hence, the
present aim of the Russian monopoly is to rein-
force its position as Western EuropeÕs main sup-
plier and to defend its interests as effectively as
possible in negotiations concerning the liberali-
sation of the European gas market. The Kremlin
expects Gazprom to maximise export profits by
directly entering the gas markets of the largest
consumers of Russian gas. This has been partly
achieved in Germany only. The Wingas company
that was established there (Gazprom 35 percent,
Wintershall 65 percent) deals with transport and
distribution of the blue fuel in the German mar-
ket in which it has presently a share of approx.
15 percent. Wingas intends to use the liberalisa-
tion of the European gas market to expand its
activities beyond Germany19.
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2.2. Development of processing 
capacity and sales networks abroad 
Another important instrument in the oil and gas
policy of the Russian Federation is to develop the
processing capacity of Russian companies and to
create proprietary sales networks abroad. Oil
companies have been particularly active in this
area for some time. In Europe, it is easier for
them to expand operations than in the former
Soviet republics (especially the Baltic States,
Ukraine and Belarus) and in Central and So-
uthern Europe. Western European companies
are willing to buy the cheaper Russian oil, but
they try to keep control of refineries, petroche-
mical and chemical plants and their sales. The
EU anti-monopoly laws offer Russian companies
a certain opportunity to enter the EU energy
market by obliging companies with excessively
high market shares to sell portions of their as-
sets20. Privatisation of energy companies offers
another such opportunity.
Limited access to Western hydrocarbon proces-
sing and petroleum product markets has indu-
ced Russian oil companies to pursue the tactic of
gradual expansion of their European holdings by
establishing ÒbridgeheadsÓ in the Baltic States,
Central Europe and the Balkans. This tactic is ba-
sed on two assumptions. Firstly, refineries in the
former Council for Mutual Economic Aid area are
located relatively close to Western European
markets, which partly solves the problem of
transporting petroleum products and reduces
costs21. Secondly, once countries of the region
become EU Member States, it will not be possi-
ble to protect the Western European market aga-
inst Russian fuels using customs instruments22.
Russian companies compete effectively for busi-
nesses in Central and Eastern Europe and in the
Baltic States and expand successfully using inter
alia the following instruments: 
Ð high or complete dependence on Russian ener-
gy resource supplies under long-term contracts
(in principle, this refers to all countries in the
post-Soviet area of influence); 
Ð transit fees, including fees for the transport of
Russian oil and petroleum products (Lithuania,
Latvia) and Russian gas (Ukraine, Slovakia, Bul-
garia), accounting for significant proportions of
the budgets of some of the countries; 
Ð informal personal and business ties between
Russian companies and managers of companies
in the energy sectors in these countries, dating
back to the USSR times or more recent, based on
mutual benefits, and the presence of pro-Russian
lobbies that determine the results of privatisa-
tion procedures and other key undertakings (to
a smaller or greater degree, this applies to all co-
untries in this area)23.
Gazprom is the best-established company in the
region. It is present in all countries of the region
as a shareholder of local gas pipeline operators
and gas distributors. When entering tenders for
shares of such businesses, Gazprom frequently
establishes coalitions with its major Western Eu-
ropean partners, being Ruhrgas, Gas de France
and ENI. 
As regards Russian oil companies, LUKoil, Yukos
and, to a smaller degree, the Tyumen Oil Compa-
ny (TNK) are the most active in the markets of
the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Block.
Their efforts are quite consistent, and their ob-
jective is obvious. All of them intend to gain con-
trol of, or at least acquire substantial shares in,
the local oil transport and processing infrastruc-
tures and to obtain direct access to the local pe-
troleum product markets.
The foreign investment policies of the two lar-
gest Russian concerns appear to follow a kind of
division of zones of influence. While LUKoil ga-
thers foreign assets in Eastern Europe (Ukraine),
the Balkans (former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia) and in the Caspian region, Yukos prefers the
western direction (Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania
and the Mediterranean). Oil companies (above
all, LUKoil and Yukos) are especially interested in
buying refineries and gas stations in markets
supplied through the Druzhba 24.
At the moment, Russian oil concerns control
a large portion of hydrocarbon processing plants
and fuel distribution networks in Ukraine, the
Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria. They also
plan to participate in the privatisation of establi-
shments in this sector in Poland (GdaÄsk Refine-
ry), Slovakia, countries of the former Yugoslavia
and in Southern Europe (Table II). 
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3. Outcomes of the Ru s s i a n
energy policy
3.1. Successes
3.1.1. CIS Ð progress in the reconstruction
of post-Soviet energy space
The Russian oil and gas policy has been imple-
mented quite successfully in the CIS where Rus-
sian companies have managed to keep and con-
sistently strengthen their positions in the ener-
gy sectors of most of the former Soviet republics.
Russia has concluded a number of contracts and
agreements with governments and state-owned
gas and oil establishments of the CIS countries,
thus gaining control of the best part of the for-
mer republicsÕ resources and preserving (for the
time being) its transit monopoly.
RussiaÕs greatest success in the CIS area seems to
have been the conclusion, after several years of
negotiations, of the 25-year gas deal with Turk-
menistan in April 200325. It guarantees Moscow
long-term supplies of relatively cheap gas from
the second largest gas producer in the CIS (after
Russia), at the same time solving GazpromÕs gas
deficit problems26. Russia has also signed transit
deals with the other Central Asian countries (Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). Strategic
agreements on co-operation with Russia in the
gas sector were concluded with all former repu-
blics in the region27.
Moscow is also building up its position in the oil
sectors of Central Asian countries. In summer
2002, a 15-year agreement for the transit of Ka-
zakh oil through the territory of the Russian Fe-
deration was signed28. Russian companies (nota-
bly LUKoil) are strengthening their holdings in
Kazakhstan, a country with the second largest
oil resources in the CIS (after Russia)29.
The fact that Russia has been able to keep its
monopoly on transit in Central Asia for the twe-
lve years that followed the break-up of the USSR
is certainly an achievement. The only major new
connection built within this period in the Ca-
spian region, i.e. the Caspian Pipeline Consor-
tium (CPC), also crosses Russian territory.
Russia tries to strengthen its position and influ-
ence in those former Soviet republics that im-
port oil and gas and at the same time are impor-
tant in terms of the transport of these resources
to Central and Western Europe. In the years
2002Ð2003, preliminary agreements were signed
with Ukraine and Belarus concerning the cre-
ation of consortia uniting Gazprom and the na-
tional owners and operators of gas infrastructu-
res (Beltransgaz and Naftohaz Ukrainy, respecti-
vely). However, contrary to the Russian si-
deÕs ambitions, both these projects are still far
from complete30. By creating these consortia Mo-
scow hopes to gain control of the most impor-
tant facilities transporting Russian energy reso-
urces to Europe. 
Russia is also reinforcing its position in the inter-
nal markets of former Soviet republics. Russian
companies hold shares in petrochemical, metal-
lurgic plants, manufacturers of pipes and equip-
ment for the oil and gas industry, transport com-
panies and gas station chains. For example, Rus-
sian companies have shares in three out of six
Ukrainian refineries, and in two of them they are
majority shareholders (Table II). 
3.1.2. Baltic States Ð preserving 
the transport monopoly 
As regards the energy policy towards the Baltic
States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), Russia has
been successfully pursuing its two main objecti-
ves: to keep the dominant position in their oil
and gas sectors and to limit its dependence on
these countries in terms of transit. Gazprom and
Russian oil companies hold monopolies on the
supplies of energy raw materials and fuels, whi-
le at the same time they possess substantial sta-
kes in the Baltic businesses dealing with the tra-
ding and distribution of natural gas and petro-
leum products (Tables I and II). In August 2002,
Yukos took control over the Lithuanian Mazeikiu
Nafta concern along with its oil refinery in Ma-
zeikiai Ð the Baltic StatesÕ only oil refinery, a por-
tion of the Lithuanian oil pipelines system and
the Butinge oil terminal31.
In order to make itself independent of the oil
transit through the Baltic States, especially thro-
ugh LatviaÕs Ventspils, the largest terminal in
the region, Russia launched its own Baltic termi-
nal in Primorsk. Nevertheless, insufficient capa-
city of RussiaÕs own infrastructure and the shor-
tage of terminals continue to impede growth of
exports, which is why Russia is unlikely to give
up efforts to take over control of Ventspils.
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3.1.3. Central Europe and the Balkans Ð
market domination
One of MoscowÕs most significant successes in
terms of the energy policy in this part of Europe
is the fact that it managed to keep countries of
the former socialist block dependent on Russian
oil and gas. Russia remains the main supplier of
energy resources to countries of the region and
has been able to successfully impede most pro-
jects to launch alternative supplies. For example,
contracts singed by Poland in 2000 for the sup-
ply of gas from Denmark and Norway have not
been ratified yet and are unlikely to be imple-
mented any time soon. Another important suc-
cess for Russia in terms of the energy policy is
the fact that Gazprom has been able to bind Po-
land with a long-term contract for the supply of
gas through the still non-existent second pipeli-
ne of the YamalÐEurope gas export route32.
MoscowÕs policy led to the signing of an agre-
ement on the reversing of the Adria oil pipeli-
neÕs direction (until now, oil had been delivered
by tankers to the Croatian Omisalj terminal and
from there to the Balkans) and its integration in-
to the Russian Druzhba export system. Yukos is
actively involved in this project33. Thus, Russia
acquired another export connection Ð a gateway
into the Adriatic, and a possibility to impede al-
ternative supplies (through the Omisalj termi-
nal). Russia is taking similar measures in relation
to the relatively new Ukrainian OdessaÐB rody pi-
peline. The original plan for this pipeline was to
export Caspian oil to Europe. However, Russian
companies supported by the Russian govern-
ment strive to use this pipeline to transport Rus-
sian oil in the opposite direction: from Brody to
Odessa, thus connecting the new Ukrainian pi-
peline with the Druzhba system. 
Russia also tries to enter local oil and gas mar-
kets by purchasing shares in businesses dealing
with the sale, transit, distribution or processing
of oil and gas. The most active company in this
respect is Gazprom, which holds substantial sha-
res in companies dealing with gas transit and di-
stribution (Table I). Similarly, Russian oil compa-
nies purchase shares of important local oil busi-
nesses. LUKoil holds majority blocks of shares in
the Bulgarian Burgas, and the Romanian Petrotel
refineries. Yukos holds shares in the Slovak pipe-
line system (Transpetrol) and in other compa-
nies (Table II).
3.1.4. Western Europe and the US 
Russian oil and gas companies invest on a much
smaller scale in Western Europe, mainly because
of the lack of sufficient funds and existing legal
barriers. Gazprom holds shares in gas sector
companies in Austria, Finland, Greece, the Ne-
therlands, Germany, Turkey and Italy. Yukos has
investmented in Norway and Great Britain (Ta-
bles I and II).
Another important achievement, from the Rus-
sian perspective, is GazpromÕs partnerships and
co-operation with Western concerns on numero-
us projects (GazpromÕs partners include Ruhr-
gas, Gas de France, ENI). The Russian monopoly
hopes that such co-operation will also be possi-
ble on the priority project of the trans-Baltic gas
pipeline, which has received a lot of publicity re-
cently. Russia has succeeded in interesting the
E u ropean side, including GermanyÕ s Ru h rg a s
and the British government, in this project. 
Finally, Russian companies have managed to en-
ter the US market in the recent years. In summer
2002, TNK and Yukos shipped first batches of oil
to the United States. While Washington seeks al-
ternatives for supplies from the Near East, Rus-
sia may become an important additional source
of oil.
3.2. Failures and problems
However, not all of RussiaÕs oil and gas plans are
implemented so successfully. Sometimes Mo-
scow fails in its efforts to impede competing
projects. As the Russian energy policy is founded
on the transit monopoly, the start of construc-
tion works on the BakuÐT b i l i s iÐCeyhan oil pipe-
l i n e and the Baku ÐTbilisiÐErzurum gas pipeline
that will transport Caspian oil and gas to Turkey
is quite a disaster. These pipelines, built by con-
sortia of Western concerns backed by the US go-
vernment, will be the first major export routes
for Caspian hydrocarbons that bypass the Rus-
sian territory.
It seems that Russia will not be able to keep its
present position in the Turkish gas market, one
of the largest consumers of Russian resources.
Ankara has signed contracts for the supply of
gas with Azerbaijan, Iran, Algeria and Nigeria. In
addition, Turkey has raised objections to the
terms of the contract concluded with Gazprom
for the supply of gas through the Blue Stream
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gas pipeline for several months. This put a qu-
estion mark over the very profitability of this
underwater pipeline investment worth several
billion, and ultimately led to negotiations con-
cerning modification of the contractÕs terms34.
Russian companies participating in tenders for
shares of European energy businesses do not al-
ways win, despite their frequently strong star-
ting positions and advanced negotiations. Gaz-
prom has failed to acquire shares in Transgas,
the Czech company dealing with the import, di-
stribution and transit of gas35. Similarly, LUKoil
did not succeed in its efforts concerning the pri-
vatisation of the Polish GdaÄsk Refinery36 or the
Greek state-owned fuel holding Hellenic Petro-
leum37.
Russia has also failed (for the time being) to esta-
b l i s h the Russian-Belarusian and Russian-Ukra-
inian gas consortia through which Gazprom could
c o n t rol gas transit across Belarus and Ukraine.
The fact that Belarus and Ukraine have been able
to impede undertakings of such significance for
Moscow demonstrates that the Russian oil and
gas policy may encounter even more serious
problems.
4. Energy dialogue between
Russia and the EU 
In 2000, Russia and the EU embarked on an ener-
gy dialogue to develop clearer relations between
the largest supplier of energy resources to the
European market, i.e. Russia, and the largest
consumer of Russian hydrocarbons, being the
European Union. The energy security of Europe
and the economic situation of the Russian Fede-
ration both depend on the shape and stability of
these relations. So far, however, the parties have
not been able to overcome fundamental differen-
ces in points of view.
The EUÕs intention is for the energy partnership
to improve mutual relations in the area of trade
and transit of Russian energy carriers (oil, natu-
ral gas and electricity) as the EU opens and inte-
grates its energy market. 
The main objectives of this partnership include3 8:
Ð amelioration of the investment climate in the
Russian oil and gas sector, in particular, better
legislation on the production and transport of
energy resources in the Russian Federation (inc-
luding aPSA (production-sharing agreement), se-
curity of long-term supplies, and transportation
systems security;
Ð the promotion of efficient and environment-
friendly technologies (the issue of Russia ratify-
ing the Kyoto protocol);
Ð stimulation of a reasonable resource economy
and promotion of energy-saving technologies in
Russia. 
The EU wants RussiaÕs participation in the ener-
gy partnership programme to stand for reforms
and modernisation of its energy sector as well as
the creation of transparent formal and legal con-
ditions to enable investment projects. Access to
the Russian conveyance infrastructure is ano-
ther important issue for the EU. It could be set-
tled if the Russian Federation ratified the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), and especially its Transit
Protocol.
The energy dialogue with the EU is apparently
very important for Russia, too. According to EU
estimates, the Russian oil and gas sector will ne-
ed investments worth US$ 460Ð600 billion over
the next twenty years in order to meet its long-
term export obligations (including obligations
toward the EU). Without financial support from
foreign investors, Russia will not be able to keep
its exports on the current level, let alone incre-
ase them. 
There are, however, a number of misunderstan-
dings and conflicting interests that hinder dialo-
gue and make efficient and mutually beneficial
co-operation difficult. 
One of the fundamental conditions that the EU
wants to impose on Russia in the energy dialogue
is the ratification of the ECT (the Treaty has been
ratified by all countries in Central Asia and So-
uthern Caucasus)3 9. Yet the Russian side, and Gaz-
p rom in particular, is reluctant to ratify the Char-
t e r. Moscow assures that its intention is not to
postpone ratification of the ECT but to force its
authors to modify some of its assumptions so
that they take into account the interests of Ru s s i a .
Russia is particularly dissatisfied with the ECT
Transit Protocol. It opens the energy market to
all producers, offering export opportunities to
new suppliers, in particular, independent produ-
cers in Russia and Central Asia that are presently
controlled by Gazprom. As a result, Gazprom
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may lose its monopoly on exports Ð the founda-
tion of its power, position and revenues. Gaz-
prom does not want to make its pipeline ne-
twork available to competing producers of the
blue fuel (Turkmenistan in the first place) as it
fears losing its monopoly on transport in the
CIS. The Ashgabat agreement signed in April
2003, which guarantees that Moscow will buy
a lionÕs share of the Turkmen gas output over 25
years, should alleviate these fears because it mi-
nimises the possibility of Turkmen gas compe-
ting with the Russian blue fuel. In addition, the
Energy Charter does not oblige its parties to ren-
der pipelines accessible to third countries, but it
forbids suspending contracted supplies without
a prior conciliation procedure. This provision
may restrict some of the practices to which the
Russian Federation has been resorting and in
a way restrain (and regulate) its methods of ma-
naging the transport system. If Russia ratified
the Energy Charter, its negotiations with other
countries (including the CIS) concerning purcha-
se and sale of gas would become restricted to
the business and legal level, and numerous poli-
tically-motivated measures would no longer be
available to Russia.
The Russian side also fears liberalisation of the
EU gas market as agreed upon in 2002, and is re-
luctant to open its own market. For many re-
asons, the rules of the emerging European gas
market Ð an open, transparent and competitive
marketplace Ð may be difficult to accept for Gaz-
prom. Firstly, they make it much more difficult
for any single entity to dominate the market. Se-
condly, they require transparency in business
(the opinions on this aspect of GazpromÕs activi-
ty are very negative, even in Russia). The Russian
monopoly rejects the EU market liberalisation
principles that aim to abandon long-term con-
tracts, cancel Òtake or payÓ clauses, and elimina-
te contractual provisions restricting the right to
freely re-export resources40. The EU believes that
the formula of GazpromÕs contracts is against
the principles of competition and that it impe-
des lowering of gas prices. Gazprom claims that
this formula is a guarantee of its creditworthi-
ness and ability to meet long-term obligations
toward European consumers. The Russian Fede-
ration also fears that the EU could introduce a li-
mit on the amount of energy resources imported
from any single source and that Russia would lo-
se its position in the European market as a re-
sult. The European Commission decided back in
1997 that no single gas exporter should have
a share of more than 30 percent in the gas balan-
ce of any EU Member State. This restriction, tho-
ugh, has not been brought fully into force yet,
for various reasons. 
At the moment, the energy dialogue between
the two sides appears to have hit a dead end.
The Russian Federation and the European Union
have different ideas of what energy dialogue
should be. The EU wishes to initiate co-opera-
tion and develop mechanisms to enable private
companies to take specific action and invest.
Moscow, on the other hand, hopes for a more po-
litical (or rather geopolitical) co-operation and
for the strengthening of GazpromÕs position in
the European market.
Ewa Paszyc
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1 For example, the Russian foreign policy doctrine assigns
priority to economic methods of influence. 
2 In the 15-year Russian-Kazakh deal of June 2002, Moscow
guarantees to transport aminimum of 17.5 million tons per
year, and this amount may be increased as Kazakh produc-
tion grows. According to Russian companies, this policy of-
fers worse conditions to domestic exporters as Russian pro-
duction volumes increase and the capacity of the Transneft
export pipelines remains insufficient.
3 Mainly from the Caspian region. MoscowÕscampaign aga-
inst the construction of the BakuÐ Tbilisi ÐCeyhan oil pipe-
line and the Baku Ð TbilisiÐ Erzurum gas pipeline has failed
to prevent the execution of the BTC, but caused substantial
delays. 
4 The Czech Republic is one of the few exceptions Ð it im-
ports Norwegian gas since 2000 under a 20-year contract
concluded in 1997. 
5 For example, statement by the European Energy and
Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio (6 Oct. 2000). 
6 This does not have to entail an increase of the Russian
share in the European gas market because the consumption
of gas will grow as well.
7 For example, President Putin at the meeting of the Rus-
sian-German business forum (Weimar, April 2002). 
8 For example, the gas pipeline transporting Norwegian gas
to Poland. International law prohibits the construction of
crossing underwater pipelines for safety reasons.
9 Yukos pursues the most active Òeastern policyÓ and
exports oil and petroleum products to China, though in
small amounts for the time being. The concern is also ne-
gotiating the construction of an oil pipeline to China (ÒNew
marketsÓ, Neft Rossii, Dec. 2001).
10 Data from a Bloomberg report 
(www.bloomberg.com/markets; 15 Dec. 2002).
11 Towards the end of this year, the Russian government an-
nounced that it would decide whether the projected pipeli-
ne would connect Angarsk and Dacin (China) reaching
a single recipient, or, in a much longer and expensive ver-
sion, connect Angarsk and Nakhodka with a branch pipeli-
ne to Dacin. The problem is how to provide a sufficient vo-
lume of oil for the latter solution (aminimum of 50 tons per
y e a r, compared to 30 million tons in the case of the AngarskÐ
ÐDacin pipeline). 
1 2 The We s t Ð East project assumes that deposits of the Ta-
rim oil field (China) will be developed, a gas pipeline of 
4 thousand km in length and a capacity of 12 billion cubic
m e t res (in the first phase) will be constructed and operated,
and that gas will be sold in the eastern regions of China.
13 For example, transport of Russian oil through Ventspils
was suspended as of 2002 in order for Transneft to take
over this important terminal.
14 It is believed that Gazprom inspired the assassinations of
Andrei Lukanov (president of BulgariaÕs Top Energy) in 1996
and Jan Ducki (president of the Slovak SPP) in 1999. Both
these companies had connections to Gazprom and were
trying to loosen these ties at the time. 
15 Under the 1998 contract, Gazprom took over the shares
the state-owned Bulgargaz had in Topenergy, a company
dealing with commercial distribution of gas in Bulgaria, in
return for redeeming its debt. Thus Gazprom became the
owner of 100 percent of shares in Topenergy. There was
a conflict between the state-owned Bulgargaz and Gaz-
prom-controlled Topenergy concerning gas transit tariffs,
among other issues. 
1 6 The consequences of this policy could be exemplified by
the situation of Europolgaz, a Polish operator of the Ya m a l Ð
Ð Western Europe gas pipeline. By influencing appointments
to the companyÕ s authorities and retaining the status of the
sole supplier of gas to Poland, the Russian monopoly has be-
en able to obtain relatively low transit prices and get the lo-
cal partners to finance a substantial share of the transporta-
tion systemÕs development. As a result, the debt of Euro p o l-
gaz exceeds US$ 1.5 billion (Puls Biznesu, 02 Aug. 2002;
w w w.pb.pl). 
17 For example, the Czech Republic can import oil through
the Trans Alpine Pipeline and Poland can use the GdaÄsk
terminal and the Pomeranian Pipeline. 
18 For example, LUKoil tried to participate in the privatisa-
tion of the GdaÄsk Refinery, a shareholder of the GdaÄsk
terminal. 
19 The most recent proposal (30 Jul. 2003) made by Wingas
was to purchase shares (32 percent) in Verbundnetz Gas
(VNG), a gas distributor controlling 80 percent of the East
German gas market and 16 percent of the general German
market from Ruhrgas. In case Wingas wins, it will get acon-
trolling block of shares in the gas distribution system of
East Germany. Wingas intends to use the liberalisation of
the European gas market to expand its activities beyond
the German border. To this end, Wingas and Gazexport ha-
ve concluded an agreement on the sale of Russian gas in
the exchange markets of Belgium and Great Britain.
20 For example, LUKoil has purchased achain of gas stations
in southern Germany from the merging BP and Aral. 
21 A refinery looses its price advantage if the end consumer
is more than 250 km away. Transporting fuel using pipeli-
nes may reduce costs, but the capacity of Russian petro-
leum product pipelines is small and the distance between
Russian refineries and their customers in Western Europe
too long (årodkowoeuropejski rynek paliwowy (Central Eu-
ropean Fuel Markets), a study by the Centre for Economic
Studies of the Institute of the Third Republic of Poland,
GdaÄsk/Warsaw, Oct. 2002).
22 These are the motives of the Russian companiesÕ invest-
ment activity in Central Europe noted by the authors of
årodkowoeuropejski rynek paliwowy (see above). 
23 For more information, see chapter The oil and gas in the
Òtransit countriesÓ of the former USSR.
24 This is one of the reasons why Russian oil companies are
interested in the GdaÄsk Refinery or Transpetrol (operator
of the Slovak section of the Druzhba). In 2002, Yukos bo-
ught 49 per cent of Transpetrol.
2 5 See Week in the East, CES, 17 Apr. 2003, Ro s y j s ko- t u r k m e Ä-
skie porozumienie gazowe (Ru s s i a n -Turkmen Gas Deal).
26 Given the gas production levels shown by Gazprom pre-
sently and those projected for the nearest future, the Rus-
sian monopoly would very shortly experience difficulties
performing its foreign contracts and supplying the internal
market. Presently, the concern cannot afford to implement
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development projects for new deposits Ð this would costs
billions. 
27 The gas deals with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan are long-term contracts. 
28 See Week in the East, CES, 13 Jun. 2002, Kazachstan i Ro-
sja zacieæniaj wsp¸prac« w sektorze surowcw energe-
tycznych.
29 See Week in the East, CES, 13 Feb. 2003, üUKoil silniejszy
w Kazachstanie.
30 For more information, see chapter The oil and gas in the
Òtransit countriesÓ of the former USSR.
31 See Week in the East, CES, 05 Sep. 2002, Jukos przejmuje
litewski koncern naftowy.
32 In 2003, the Polish government renegotiated some provi-
sions of this contract.
33 See Week in the East, CES, 19 Dec. 2002, Rosyjska ropa
pop¸ynie przez Adriatyk.
34 If Turkey succeeds, this will establish a precedent based
on which other European consumer may also renegotiate
the terms of their contracts. For more information, see: We-
ek in the East, CES, 10 Jul. 2003, Turecko-rosyjski konflikt
o B¸«kitny Potok zaostrza si« (The Turkish-Russian conflict
over the Blue Stream pipeline intensifies).
35 See Week in the East, CES, 20 Dec. 2001, Prywatyzacja
czeskiej energetyki.
36 This was covered by Rzeczpospolita in the 03 Oct. 2002 ar-
ticle Ostateczny rozpad konsorcjum Rotcha i üukoila. Accor-
ding to the most recent statements by the concernÕs presi-
dent, LUKoil has not given up its plans to participate in the
privatisation of RG. Yukos, too, has repeatedly declared that
it was interested in buying the Polish refinery.
37 See RIA RosBusinessConsulting, 05 Feb. 2003, Greeks
donÕt give in to Lukoil, et. al.
38 Source: http://europa.eu.int 
39 Cf. http://www.encharter.org/index.jsp?psk=0602&ptp
=tDetail.jsp&pci=24&pti=21 
40 Gazprom has already declared it was ready for conces-
sions on this issue.
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Chapter 3. 
The oil and gas 
in the Òtransit countriesÓ
of the former USSR 
Arkadiusz Sarna
1. The importance of oil 
and gas sectors in the region. 
Basic information. Key facilities
1.1. Differing degrees of the oil 
and gas sectorsÕ importance 
for countries of the region 
The oil and gas reserves and production of the
Òtransit countriesÓ in the former USSR area, being
Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia,
are of negligible importance on the global scale.
Domestically produced hydrocarbons satisfy on-
ly a fraction of these countriesÕ own needs and
account for a small portion in their energy ba-
lances. 
Even though these countries have been under-
going economic transformation for more than
a decade now, and their energy resource con-
sumption has dropped significantly since 1991,
their economies remain highly energy-intensive
(this refers to Belarus and Ukraine in particular).
Hence, they remain heavily dependent on im-
ports of oil and gas, the principal energy sources
for most of them. 
Almost all oil and gas imported into the region
comes from Russia. Only Ukraine imports signi-
ficant quantities of energy resources from Cen-
tral Asia. However, even Asian supplies have to
cross the territory of Russia, a country that con-
trols the main oil and gas transport routes thro-
ughout the CIS area. The reliance of newly inde-
pendent states on energy resource imports has
turned out to be a serious economic issue and
one of the main factors in these countriesÕ cru-
cially important relations with Russia. 
The regionÕs most important oil and gas facilities
include the transit infrastructure. Proceeds from
transit services provided to Russia account for
a substantial portion of export revenues in Ukra-
ine, Belarus and the Baltic States. Since the most
important routes transporting Russian oil and
gas to Europe cross the region, control of this in-
frastructure is one of the most important assets
the regionÕs countries posses, as far as their rela-
tions with Russia are concerned. On the other
hand, oil and gas are the main Russian export
commodities. For this reason, Russia tries to con-
solidate its influence on transit infrastructure
operations and to take control over the key oil
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and gas facilities in the area. Dependence of the
regionÕs countries on energy resource imports is
RussiaÕs most convenient tool in the implemen-
tation of its strategy, which aims to take over
major local facilities of the oil and gas sectors. 
All countries of the region rely on energy resour-
ce imports from Russia. The scope of this depen-
dence differs from country to country, though,
affecting the energy security of individual states
to varying degrees, depending on the weight of
imported energy resources in the energy balan-
ces of individual countries and the nature of the
i n f r a s t ructural ties between their re s p e c t i v e
energy sectors and Russia. This impact on ener-
gy security is also dependent on the progress of
reforms in individual countries, their different
political and economic strategies and varying
geopolitical outlooks. Because of these differen-
ces in situations and prospects, particular coun-
tries of the region have different chances of jo-
ining the energy co-operation between the EU
and Russia, as players in their own right.
Ukraine is the only major oil and gas producer
among the transit countries. It possesses the re-
gionÕs largest hydrocarbon reserves. As the re-
sult of a crisis, exacerbated in the early 1990s by
the Soviet UnionÕs disintegration, Ukrainian oil
and gas production decreased considerably. In the
second half of the 1990s, annual gas pro d u c t i o n
in Ukraine stabilised at around 18 billion cubic
m e t res. Oil production stabilised around 4 million
tons annually (Tables IV, V and VII)1. Gas and oil
account for a dominant portion in UkraineÕs pri-
mary energy balance (approx. 61 percent; gas
alone accounts for approx. 45 percent)2. Despite
the twelve years of transformation and a syste-
matic decline of consumption, Ukraine still utili-
ses huge amounts of gas and substantial quanti-
ties of oil (Tables V and VII), because its economy
continues to be dominated by the energy-inten-
sive heavy industry. As a result, Ukraine remains
one of the worldÕs largest gas importers and the
single largest importer in the region3. Neverthe-
less, under deals signed with Gazprom, Ukraine
also exports increasing amounts of gas to Cen-
tral European countries4. Additionally, Ukraine is
the main transit country in the Russian gas
exports system and a major transit country for
Russian oil5.
Nearly 100 percent of gas consumed in Belarus
comes from Russia. Domestically produced oil
accounts for approx. 25 percent of internal de-
mand6 and imports come entirely from Russia
(Tables V and VII). Belarus shows the highest
proportion of gas in the primary energy balance
(70 percent) among all countries of the region7.
To put it simply, the functioning of the Belaru-
sian economy is founded on the cheap Russian
Òpolitical gasÓ whose price is correlated with the
policy direction currently pursued by President
Alexander Lukashenko.
Among the three Baltic States, only Lithuania
possesses small gas reserves. None of the repu-
blics produce any gas and all of them are fully
dependent on Russian imports (Tables V, VII and
VIII). Oil deposits in the Lithuanian offshore area
are operated on a small scale, providing for
a fraction of the republicÕs demand. Exploitation
of oil deposits in the Latvian section of the Bal-
tic shelf is still a matter of the future. In Estonia,
oil shale plays an important role. Shale deposits
are found in the north-eastern part of the Repu-
blic and they provide for as much as 75 percent
of the republicÕs energy consumption. However,
liquid fuels made from oil shale account for less
than 20 percent of domestic consumption. Gas
plays a dominant role in the primary energy ba-
lance of Latvia (it accounts for approx. 35 per-
cent) and a substantial one in the balance of Li-
thuania (31 percent), whose principal energy so-
urce (35 percent of the primary energy consump-
tion) is oil imported chiefly from Russia8.
1.2. Key infrastructure facilities
Import dependence does not translate directly
into the lack of energy security, also due to the
fact that Russia has to use the local oil and gas
infrastructure, or, more specifically, the transit
services it provides. 
RussiaÕs main westward oil export connection Ð
the Druzhba pipeline system Ð crosses Belarus
and Ukraine. Ukraine is also the location of the
main route for RussiaÕs gas export to Europe.
Ukrainian oil terminals in Odessa are an impor-
tant link in the Russian crude oil export system.
Until recently, the Baltic oil terminals (in La-
tviaÕs Ventspils, Butinge of Lithuania and in Tal-
linn) have played equally important roles. After
the USSR broke up, the former union republics
inherited certain facilities without which the
Russian gas export system cannot perform in
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a stable manner. These include the giant under-
ground gas storage facilities in Ukraine, notably
EuropeÕs largest store in Bilche-Volitsk in we-
stern Ukraine, with a storage capacity of 19 bil-
lion cubic metres (UkraineÕs total gas storage ca-
pacity exceeds 30 billion cubic metres), as well
as the storage facility in LatviaÕs Incukalna9 with
capacity of around 4 billion cubic metres. Other
important facilities in the sector include refine-
ries10. All of them were built back in the Soviet ti-
mes and were intended to serve the Soviet
UnionÕs needs, both in terms of exports and do-
mestic consumption. Beside the major transit pi-
pelines connecting the East with the West, i.e.
Europe, the formerly ÒinternalÓ Soviet pipelines
still play an important role today. They include
the Ukrainian pipelines that cross eastern Ukra-
ine to reach the south-western parts of the Rus-
sian Federation and deliver Russian oil to Rus-
siaÕs largest terminal in Novorossiysk on the
Black Sea11.
1.3. The sectorÕ s importance 
to Russia 
Taking into account the significance of the re-
gionÕs oil and gas exports to the Russian budget,
one has to admit that the oil and gas sectors of
these countries Ð and especially their transit in-
frastructure Ð are of fundamental importance for
Russia. While Russian companies are gradually
taking over petrochemical plants12, and regional
market reforms progress steadily, market poten-
tial of the transit countries becomes increasingly
significant for Russia Ð transit countries offer
a large outlet for gas and a growing market for
oil and petroleum products13.
Russia has no choice but to export its oil and
gas. In the longer run, it will remain dependent
on the European direction of exports. Hence, to
continue with the western direction of economic
expansion it has to obtain the most favourable
export terms possible. This means that Moscow
needs to consolidate its influence on the strate-
gic facilities in the region, first and foremost Ð
the transit infrastructure. This is part of a bro-
ader strategy to keep the region Ð GazpromÕs ca-
nonical territory, as one of the commentators
put it Ð within RussiaÕs zone of influence. The
basic tools which Moscow implements in its
strategy concerning the region include exploita-
tion of the infrastructural ties between energy
sectors of the former Soviet republics and their
dependence on energy resource imports as well
as impeding any measures taken by the newly
independent states to make themselves inde-
pendent of Russia in terms of energy.
1.4. The sectorÕ s importance 
to the We s t
From the Western perspective, Russia remains
the only major political and economic partner in
the region for the time being, and this determi-
nes the character of bilateral relations. Other co-
untries of the region, though, will become incre-
asingly important for the West as their reforms
continue, their economic potential grows and
especially, in case Russia does indeed increase its
exports to the EU as forecast. The direction and
success of reforms implemented by the Baltic
States, to be crowned with their accession to the
EU in 2004, have attracted Western investors to
the local energy sectors. However, due to the
specific ties existing between local energy sec-
tors and the Russian Federation, Western inve-
stors are forced to take into account the Russian
factor that dominates the region. As a result,
Russian companies are gradually taking over
control of strategic facilities in the energy sec-
tors, both in the Baltic States (even though the
Baltic republics prefer Western capital) and, on
a greater scale, in Belarus and Ukraine. 
The region offers the shortest route for the
exports of Russian energy resources to Europe,
which are forecast to rise steadily in the coming
years. Provided these projections are correct, it
may be necessary for the West to become more
intensively involved in ensuring the security of
supplies and in the construction of a stable ener-
gy bridge between Russia, the resource provider,
and the European consumers. Ukraine, and espe-
cially Belarus, have no prospects of integration
with European structures in the foreseeable fu-
ture. The status of an energy bridge could be the
best insurance policy for their economic sovere-
ignty and an important asset that could poten-
tially help them join in the energy co-operation
between Europe and Russia. The role Belarus
and Ukraine play in this co-operation will large-
ly determine their international status.
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2. Energy policies of countries
in the region
2.1. Belarus: Efforts to preserve 
the status quo
Taking account of the huge role oil and gas play
in the energy-intensive Belarusian economy, offi-
cial documents define priorities of the sta-
t e Õ s e n e rgy policy as implementation of energ y -
saving pro g r a m m e s1 4 and development of a d o-
mestic natural re s o u rces potential. Some also call
for diversification of energy re s o u rce supplies.
The Belarusian programme for social and econo-
mic development in 2001Ð2005 concludes that
Òthe republic is almost fully dependentÓ on ener-
gy re s o u rce imports from Russia, which calls for
Òdevelopment of alternative variants of energ y
suppliesÓ in view of BelarusÕ energy security1 5.
President Lukashenko, whose words frequently
mean more in Belarus than official documents,
has repeatedly asserted the need to include di-
versification of gas and oil supplies in the go-
vernmentÕs plans concerning provision of ener-
gy resources16. In practice, though, such state-
ments are usually little more than an emotional
response to the political moves of Moscow and
an attempt to press Russia over specific issues
involved in the energy co-operation of the two
countries17. The conclusions of official strategies
are right, but they never lead to specific measu-
res on the part of Belarusian authorities.
The measures that are actually taken and do af-
fect the energy sectorÕs functioning are in ke-
eping with the general line of MinskÕs political
and economic strategy. They are largely limited
to attempts to preserve the status quo of energy
relations with Russia, i.e. to secure stable sup-
plies of cheap Russian resources for the energy-
intensive Belarusian economy in return for low-
cost transit of Russian gas to the West. (Prices on
the transport of gas through Belarus are 2.5 ti-
mes lower than Ukrainian rates and 4 times lo-
wer than average European rates18). 
The authorities in Minsk defer fundamental de-
cisions, not only on the political, but also on the
economic level related to the actual dimension
of the integration. This is evident, for example,
in the repeatedly delayed privatisation. Privati-
sation of the Beltransgaz state monopoly and
the Belarusian petrochemical industry could be
a good example of this Òavoidance strategyÓ in
energy co-operation. 
Russia has long been trying to take control over
the state-owned gas monopoly. Pressed by Mo-
scow, which exploits BelarusÕ dependence on
Russian energy resources and its permanent ina-
bility to pay for supplies, Minsk finally decided
to privatise strategic establishments. In April
2002, Minsk and Moscow signed an agreement
on co-operation in the gas sector. It provided
that, as of May 2002, internal Russian gas prices
should be applied to fuel supplied to Belarus and
as of July 1, 2003, a consortium of Beltransgaz
and Gazprom should be established. In accor-
dance with schedule, the Belarusian concern
was privatised by April 1, 2003, and on April 30,
the Securities Commission in Minsk registered
Beltransgaz as a company owned 100 percent by
the state 19. At this point, though, the privatisa-
tion procedure and consortium formation was
stopped. 
On July 16, 2003, Minsk presented privatisation
terms which barred out Russia Ð an open tender
for a minority block of shares in the company,
which the Belarusian side evaluated at US$ 2.5
billion20 (Gazprom had offered a maximum of
US$1 billion for a controlling block of shares).
Minsk has been unrelenting over the Beltrans-
gaz issue and privatisation of the petrochemical
industry21. This has not only caused an impasse
in privatisation procedures within the energy
sector and a stalling of the joint consortium pro-
ject, but also seriously impaired mutual rela-
tions between Russia and Belarus22. Irrespective
of the fate of successive projects to integrate the
post-Soviet space, Belarus, being isolated from
other political processes taking place in the re-
gion, gradually becomes RussiaÕs peripheral bul-
wark. The energy dependence is one of the key
factors that determine the direction and speed
of this drift.
2.2. Ukraine: Struggle for a role 
in the energy game
The situation of Ukraine is better than that of
Belarus, owing to the direction and progress of
transformation processes that started back in
1991, and to UkraineÕs economic potential, inc-
luding its transit capabilities. Recently imple-
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mented reforms, even if frequently incomplete,
have streamlined the economyÕ s f u n c t i o n i n g
over the last several years. As a result, Ukraine is
no longer chronically insolvent and can pay for
the gas imported from Russia and Turkmenistan.
Unlike Belarus, it has admitted foreign investors
to its energy market. Consequently, major local
refineries were taken over by Russian compa-
nies, but simultaneously, Western capital also
flew into Ukraine23. Kyiv also took more active
measures to diversify the supplies of energy re-
sources and to make Ukraine less dependent on
the Russian monopoly. It has also been trying to
participate, as an independent player, in the
energy dialogue between Russia and Europe. 
The largest Ukrainian diversification project is
the Eurasian Oil Transportation Corridor
( E AO TC). In the first half of the 1990s, Ukraine
e m b a r ked on the plan to build the OdessaÐB ro d y
pipeline as part of the EAOTC. This pipeline was
meant to provide Caspian oil to European coun-
tries via Ukraine, thus making the region less de-
pendent on Russian supplies. Despite financing
problems24, the first line of this connection, as
well as a new terminal in Pivdenny to which Ca-
spian oil was to be delivered by tankers, were
commissioned already in 2002. On 27 May 2003,
the European Commission spelt out its support
for this project as a route, albeit still only poten-
tial, for transporting Caspian oil to Europe. Ho-
wever, the fate of this major undertaking inten-
ded to diversify UkraineÕs supplies and re d u c e
the countryÕ s dependence on Russian oil re m a i n s
uncertain. This is because there remain a g re a t
deal of unsolved business and technical issues2 5
and because Russia continues to press Ukraine
to use the pipeline ÒtemporarilyÓ for the trans-
port of Russian oil in the opposite direction Ð
from Brody to Odessa and further by sea.
Nevertheless, it is gas that plays a dominant ro l e
in the energy-intensive Ukrainian economy and
will continue to do so in the longer term. In spi-
te of the timid attempts at reforms, the gas sec-
tor remains in the hands of a s t a t e -owned mono-
poly Ð the Naftohaz Ukrainy holding that con-
t rols gas production, distribution and transit2 6.
Like in Belarus and Russia, the gas monopoly
plays an important, though costly, social role by
keeping the energy prices low. Limited scale of
structural transformation in the sector, scarce
presence of Western investors, influence of in-
formal oligarchic groups in the industry Ð for
these and other reasons there have been very
few investments in the sector, and plans to in-
crease domestic output have failed. As a result,
Ukraine remains dependent on gas imports. 
In the foreseeable future, Ukraine has no reali-
stic chances of reducing its dependence on im-
ported gas, which means that it is in fact bound
to remain dependent on Russia in this respect.
Kyiv tries to diversify the sources of gas supplies
by co-operating with Turkmenistan. However,
Turkmen gas is delivered to Ukraine via the Rus-
sian pipeline system. As a result, Ukraine has to
seek other ways to counter the actual and poten-
tial impact of this dependence on its energy se-
curity. UkraineÕs main asset in this respect is its
transit gas pipelines Ð RussiaÕs main gas export
connection with European countries. 
Taking account of the importance of these pipe-
lines for Russia and the EU, and the forecast
growth of Russian gas imports to the EU, Kyiv
has taken active measures to join the RussiaÐEU
energy dialogue. These measures include a pro-
ject to establish an international consortium
with Gazprom and European companies to ma-
nage the network of UkraineÕs major transit pi-
pelines. In keeping with the interests of Kyiv,
such a consortium would enable Ukraine to keep
the revenues and assets of a transit country27.
Ukraine initiated talks concerning the future of
its gas pipelines with Russia and Western coun-
tries after many years of pursuing a policy simi-
lar to the present strategy of Belarus, which con-
sisted of efforts to preserve the gas status quo.
One has the impression that Kyiv decided to be-
gin serious negotiations only after Russia came
up with projects to create new gas transport
connections with Europe that would bypass
Ukraine and thus threatened the Ukrainian mo-
nopoly on the transport of Russian gas.
2.3. The Baltic States: a fiasco 
of the energy security strategy 
The progress of reforms and geopolitical pro-
spects set the situation of the Baltic States apart
from the predicament of the other former USSR
countries that co-operate within the Common-
wealth of Independent States. Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia are the only former Soviet republics
that embarked on a consistent and, more impor-
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t a n t l y, effective system transformation after
1991. In mid 2004, their efforts will be crowned
with accession to the European Union. 
As part of their geopolitical strategies, the Baltic
States took measures to improve their energy se-
curity. Already in the first years of independen-
ce, Lithuania decided to build the oil terminal in
Butinge, with a view to import oil from the West
by sea and thus make the Baltic StatesÕ only oil
refinery in Mazeikiai less dependent on oil im-
ports from Russia.
The policy of attracting Western investments has
been an important element in the ÒEuro- At l a n t i c
s t r a t e g yÓ of the Baltic States. In addition to gene-
rating economic profits, it was intended to coun-
terbalance Russian influence28. The Baltic States
made their markets wide open, more than any
other former USSR country and, in some areas,
even more than Central European countries.
This led to a great influx of investments, mainly
from Scandinavia. The investments stimulated
further transformation and economic growth,
and proved that there was more and more confi-
dence in the Baltic markets and the direction of
their reforms. Liberalisation, consistent privati-
sation and dynamic economic growth in the
1 9 9 0 s w e re among the reasons that Brussels took
into account as it decided to invite the three re-
publics to negotiate their EU accession in 1999.
Transformations in the energy sector aimed to
restructure, commercialise and partly privatise
strategic facilities with the preferred, Western
capital. In this way, Western investors could gra-
dually take over control of the energy sec-
torÕs key facilities. In 1999, Mazeikiu Nafta, the
Lithuanian oil holding in possession of the Baltic
StatesÕ only oil refinery in Mazeikiai and the Bu-
tinge terminal, was privatised and taken over by
US-based Williams International. In 2000, the
government in Tallinn signed the preliminary
agreement for the sale of 49 percent of shares in
the countryÕs two largest power plants that ge-
nerated 90 percent of EstoniaÕs electricity to
NRG Energy, another American company29. Li-
thuania and Latvia, who possess similar amo-
unts of hydrocarbon resources in the Baltic Shelf,
invited western investors to explore their
fields30.
However, the commitments of Western capital
in the local energy sectors of the Baltic States fa-
iled to produce the desired results. It appeared
that the determination of Vilnius or Tallinn, the
potential of Western investors and a favourable
international situation were not enough for the
ambitious plans to end energy dependence on
Russia to become reality. As a result of pressure
from Russia, who cut oil supplies, the US inve-
stor was forced to sell its controlling shares in
Mazeikiu Nafta to Yukos Ð a decision the Lithu-
anian Parliament had to approve in September
2002. Latvia is also being successfully pressed by
Russia. As of January 2003, Transneft excluded
Ventspils from its schedule of export supplies.
Losses resulting from suspension of transit amo-
unt to more than a dozen million dollars each
month, according to the Latvians. Commenta-
tors believe that this is meant to force Riga to
approve the taking over of shares in what used
to be the largest Baltic export terminal, by the
Russians. 
3. Grounds of the failure of 
the regionÕs policy to end its
Òenergy dependenceÓ on Russia. 
Prospects of the oil and gas 
sectors in the Òtransit countriesÓ
of the former USSR
Major undertakings in the region intended to re-
duce its energy dependence on Russia have fa-
iled mainly because they ran counter to the inte-
rests of the Russian Federation. The two sidesÕ
potentials and, consequently, the weight of the-
ir arguments, are deeply asymmetric. As a result,
countries of the region are usually forced to take
account of Russian interests. This refers to all of
them without exception, irrespective of the pro-
gress of their reforms and future development
prospects. Belarus drifts towards Russia, Ukraine
tries to manoeuvre its way between Russia and
the West and activates its own energy policy,
and the Baltic States are rapidly reforming their
economies and integrating with the European
Union Ð but all of these countries have been for-
ced in recent years to revise a number of their
energy policy objectives under pressure from
Russia. 
The effectiveness of RussiaÕs policy towards the
region is founded on MoscowÕs overwhelmingly
larger potential and consistent implementation
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of its long-term strategy. In addition, Moscow
has a broad range of instruments at its disposal.
It can afford to impose economic blockades that
generate losses to Russian companies involved
in the region, at the same time affecting the
small Baltic economies much more severely. It
deals with different countries effectively using
the Òcarrot-and-stickÓ method, e.g. by skilfully
setting gas prices31. The authorities in Moscow
have the support of powerful allies Ð the Russian
oil companies and Gazprom who frequently im-
plement measures that are consistent with their
countryÕs long-term strategy towards the re-
gion, even if they are doubtful from the econo-
mic point of view32.
Arguments of the regionÕs countries in their rela-
tions with Russia are undermined, in addition to
the import dependence and disproportion of po-
tentials and assets, by their faltering and incon-
sistently implemented political and economic
strategies. The Baltic States have made a few
reckless and poorly considered privatisation de-
cisions that favoured Western investors, but al-
so, they have failed to co-ordinate their actions
and engaged in exhausting competition over
Russian oil transit, which only made it easier for
Russia to press individual republics. In Ukraine,
an internal consensus is missing on fundamen-
tal issues concerning the future development of
the countryÕs oil and gas pipeline network, as
demonstrated by the discordant views on the
operation priorities of the OdessaÐBrody pipeli-
ne or formation of the gas consortium. Finally,
Belarus is deferring fundamental economic re-
forms, thus having no options but to keep buy-
ing the cheap Russian resources in return for
economic concessions.
Strong traditional economic ties have been inhe-
rited from the USSR, and new bonds that are for-
ming on this basis involve powerful pro-Russian
industry lobbies in individual countries. This,
too, has contributed to the consolidation of the
gas and oil status quo and the failure of attempts
to diversify energy resource supplies and to seek
alternatives to Russian projects. 
All of these factors, exacerbated in the case of
Ukraine, and especially Belarus, by the unfavo-
urable investment climate stemming from slow
progress of reforms, have deterred major foreign
businesses. Guided by economic considerations,
they do not regard countries of the region as se-
rious partners for their energy undertakings Ð
the Baltic states do not have sufficient potential,
Ukraine spells out contradictory or negative
messages concerning investment opportuni-
ties33, and Belarus utters no investment messa-
ges at all. The West sees this region in the con-
text of its relations with Russia, which remains
the only major, albeit difficult, partner. Russia
dictates the terms of co-operation in this part of
the world and is not interested in having compe-
titors emerge in the region it regards to be its ve-
ry own zone of influence. As Western investors
show little interest in the region, its countries
are doomed to co-operate with Russia on terms
determined by the latter, and they cannot coun-
ter the impact of unilateral dependence on ener-
gy security.
The dependence of the regionÕs oil and gas sec-
tors on Russia seems to be permanent, irrespec-
tive of the progress of reforms and the develop-
ment prospects of individual countries in the
upcoming years. Yet its scope and nature, and
the resulting threat to energy security and poli-
tical independence, differ from country to coun-
try. The threat is much less serious in the case of
the Baltic States, which are less sensitive to Rus-
siaÕs price policy than Ukraine and Belarus and
much more stable, especially as they are about
to join the European Union. Ukraine, and espe-
cially Belarus, are reforming slowly and have no
realistic alternatives to cheap Russian energy re-
sources. These countries will remain under the
pressure of tight economic and infrastructural
bonds dating back to Soviet times. The energy-
intensive economies of Ukraine and Belarus are
very closely bound with the Russian economy
which not only supplies cheap energy, but also
offers a market for the products of hundreds of
Ukrainian and Belarusian businesses that could
not be competitive in the world markets. (The
economic growth observed in recent years, espe-
cially in Ukraine and Belarus, was largely due to
the improved economic situation and increased
consumer demand in Russia). 
The energy dialogue between the EU and Ru s s i a
offers Ukraine an opportunity to improve its situ-
ation and energy security (in the case of Belaru s ,
this opportunity is purely theoretical). Kyiv faces
a chance to become an important link in pro j e c t s
involving the transit of energy re s o u rces fro m
the East Ð not only from Russia Ð to the West. 
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Its role, however, hinges on a number of factors,
including the development of an energy strategy
in keeping with the EUÕs expectations, the evo-
lution of RussiaÕs policy towards the region (to-
day Russia is reluctant to admit new players to
its dialogue with the West), and reforms in Ukra-
ine itself. Hence, it will take more than commit-
ments on the part of the EU Ð Ukraine, too, will
have to show determination and make great ef-
forts. The fate of the gas consortium, possibly in-
volving Western companies, and of the project
to transport Caspian oil to Europe via the Ode-
ssaÐBrody pipeline could serve as a test of Ukra-
ineÕs intentions in this respect.
In varying degrees, all countries of the region re-
main dependent on proceeds from the transit of
Russian oil and gas. Irrespective of the imple-
mentation prospects of RussiaÕs new projects to
build export oil and gas pipelines bypassing the
region, it will remain the main energy resource
transport corridor between Russia and Europe
for the next couple of years, and Russia will con-
tinue to depend on it. This offers countries of the
region a good opportunity to develop, in co-ope-
ration with the EU, an optimal and more part-
nership-like model for co-operation between the
transit countries of the former USSR, the West
and Russia.
Arkadiusz Sarna
1 1975 was the year of peak production: Ukraine produced
68.7 billion cubic metres of gas. Oil production reached its
peak in 1972 with 14.4 million tons. Source: Naftohaz Ukra-
iny (http://www.naftogaz.com/ukr/about/history). 
2 Source: www.bp.com
3 Supplies from Russia account for about half of the approx.
60 billion cubic metres of gas imported annually. These sup-
plies are reckoned up for transit services provided by Ukra-
ine to Gazprom (in the late 90sUkraine obtained approx. 30
billion cubic metres of gas in this way, in 2002 Ð 26 billion
cubic metres, and in 2003 this volume is expected to drop
to 24 billion cubic metres). The remainder comes from Turk-
menistan, and some quantity of gas is also imported from
Uzbekistan. There are plans to import gas from Kazakhstan.
4 Naftohaz Ukrainy projects to export 7 billion cubic metres
of gas in 2003. By May 2003, the concern had already sold
2 billion cubic metres of gas to Germany, 0.6 billion cubic
m e t res to Hungary, 0.4 billion cubic metres to Romania and
0.3 billion cubic metres to Poland. Source: Kievskie vedomosti,
05 Sep. 2003.
5 Transit of oil and gas is provided by the state-owned mo-
nopoly Naftohaz Ukrainy. In 2001, companies of the hol-
ding transited 122.8 billion cubic metres of Russian gas
(104.3 cubic metres to Europe and 18.5 billion cubic metres
to CIS countries) and approx. 48.6 million tons of oil. 
Source: Naftohaz Ukrainy, 2001 Report 
(http://www.naftogaz.com/files/sm14_report2001.pdf).
6 Belarus gets small quantities of gas as a side product of oil
production (which is also carried out on a small scale) in
the Polesia fields. In recent years, Belarus produced less
than 2 million tons of oil and 0.2Ð0.3 billion cubic metres of
gas per year (Tables V and VII).
7 Source: www.bp.com 99 percent of electricity produced 
in Belarus comes from oil and gas-fired power plants. 
Source: Baltic Sea Region, Energy Information Agency
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/baltics.html).
8 Source: Baltic Sea Region..., Latvijas Gaze (http://www.
lg.lv/uploads/LG_Fakts_ENG.pdf) and www.bp.com
9 Built, as the Ukrainian storage facilities, in Soviet times, it
ensures stability of the gas supplies system to the Baltic
States. Belarus has the Osipovichi storage facility whose
operational capacity is 0.36 billion cubic metres of gas.
After the Pribug facility with acapacity of 0.48 billion cubic
metres is launched (while the construction of another one
is being considered), total storage capacity will reach only
approx. 8 percent of the economyÕs annual consumption,
much below the 30 percent world standard, which the Bal -
tic and Ukrainian storage facilities do meet. Source: Latvijas
Gaze (http://www. l g . l v / u p l o a d s / L G _ Fakts_ENG.pdf) and:
Programma socyalno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya 
(http://president.gov.by/rus/programm/pr1.html).
10 Ukrainian refineries in Kremenchug, Lysychansk, Kher-
son, Odessa, Drohobych and Nadvirna; Belarusian plants in
Mozyr and Novapolatsk, and the Baltic StatesÕ only oil refi-
nery in Mazeikiai, Lithuania.
11 The eastern Ukrainian refinery in Lysychansk, built in the
1980s as UkraineÕslargest and most modern plant at the ti -
me, was constructed to provide for those markets of south-
western Russia, which form the border area today. For mo-
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re information on the plantÕsproblems following the break-
up of the USSR see: Arkadiusz Sarna, UkrainaÐRosja: ÒStra-
tegiczne partnerstwoÓ, strategiczne... uzaleýnienie?, CES
Studies, 10 Mar. 1999.
12 Russian companies have recently taken over control of
the regionÕsmost important refineries: in Lysychansk (TNK),
Odessa (LUKoil), and Mazeikiai (Yukos). They also hold
a substantial influence over the activities of most of the
other ones, including plants in Kremenchug (Tatneft), Kher-
son (formally controlled by Kazakhoil, and managed by the
Russian Alians group), and in Mozyr (Slavneft).
13 Countries of the region import large amounts of gas from
Russia. In 2002, the total volume of their imports exceeded
50 billion cubic metres (Source: IEA, 2003). They also import
ever larger amounts of Russian oil (according to data of the
Russian customs authority, in 2002, the five countries toge-
ther imported more than 40 million tons of oil worth ap-
prox. US$ 5.2 billion, i.e. ca 18 percent of RussiaÕs total oil
exports).
1 4 See, for example: Kabinet Ministrov Respubliki Belarus, Po-
stanovleniye ob osnovnykh napravleniyakh energ e t i c h e s ko y
politiki Respubliki Belarus na period do 2010 goda, 5 marta
1996 g. N168, Minsk (http://pravo2000.by. ru / b a z a 1 9 / d 1 8 3
7 3 . h t m ) .
1 5 Programma socyalno- e ko n o m i c h e s kogo razvitiya
(http://president.gov.by/rus/programm/pr1.html).
16 Interfax, 21 Apr. 2000.
17 See, for example, the address by President Alexander Lu-
k a s h e n ko on 7 November 2002. 
( h t t p : / / w w w. p re s i d e n t . g o v. b y / ru s / p re s i d e n t / n e w s / a rc h i v e /
n o v e m b e r 2 0 0 2 / 4 - 8 /news0711-3.html).
18 Interfax, 24 Sep. 2003.
19 See Week in the East, CES, 24 Jul. 2003, Kolejne ch¸odne
lato w stosunkach bia¸orusko-rosyjskich; Week in the East,
CES, 10 Apr. 2003, Bia¸oruæÐRosja: cig dalszy prywatyza-
cyjnej rozgrywki.
20 Svetlana Borozdina, Ni gaza, ni rubla (http://www.gaze-
ta.ru/2003/09/08/nigazanirubl.shtml). 
21 The following Russian companies were interested in
acquiring shares in the Belarusian petrochemical industry:
LUKoil, Itera, Sibur, Surgutneftegas and Slavneft. The Bela-
rusian Ministry of Economy presented the privatisation
terms of the four leading establishments of this sector, be-
ing Naftan, Polimer, Azot and Khimvolokno, on 3 June 2003
in Minsk. It offered minority 43-percent stakes, among
other assets. The Russians found these terms to be unsatis-
factory and Sibur withdrew from the tender. See Week in
the East, CES, 10 Apr. 2003, Bia¸oruæÐRosja: cig dalszy pry-
watyzacyjnej rozgrywki.
22 In early September 2003, Russian media reported on
a letter sent by the Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller to the le-
aders of Beltransgaz. In that letter Miller said he was with-
drawing from the plans to establish the consortium and in-
tended to revise his concernÕs price policy towards Belarus
as of January 2004. According to Russian commentators,
Gazprom made this move in response to Minsk rejecting
the Russian variant of the agreement on the introduction of
a joint currency, the Russian Ruble, in Belarus as of January
2005.
23 For example, as early as 1994, Poltavska Hazonaftova
Kompania was established. Today, it is the largest private-
owned gas producer in Ukraine, and its strategic investor is
JP Kenny, an affiliate of the British JKX Oil&Gas. In 2001, the
US-based AES Corporation became the strategic investor of
several district electricity distributors as a result of privati-
sation competitions.
24 Ukraine financed this project from its own funds.
25 Including the absence of contracts with suppliers and
consumers of oil and the distant prospect of extending the
pipeline to P¸ock as projected by the EAOTC lobbyists.
26 The concern also controls the domestic oil market (e.g.
through shares in Ukrnafta, the countryÕs largest oil produ-
cer), including the transit of oil (it does so by managing 100
p e rcent of shares in the state-owned Ukrtransnafta).
Ukrtransnafta was established in 2001 as a result of the
merger of two state-owned oil transport businesses Ð the
Lviv-based Druzhba and Pridniprovsky Magistralny Nafto-
provody of Kremenchug. It manages the Ukrainian oil pipe-
line system, including the OdessaÐBrody pipeline. 
27 Among potential Western partners, Ruhrgas and Gaz de
France have shown most interest in the project. However,
negotiations concerning the establishment of the consor-
tium continue mainly between Russia and Ukraine.
28 See: Joanna Hyndle, Miryna Kutysz, Lithuania, Latvia and
EstoniaÕsAspirations to Integrate with NATO and the EU in
the Context of these CountriesÕ Relations with Russia (Dýe-
nia Litwy, üotwy i Estonii do integracji z N ATO i UE a s t o s u n-
ki tych krajw z Rosj), CES Studies, number 4, May 2002.
29 In January 2002, Estonia cancelled the power plant sale
agreement as it concluded that political motives for this
transaction, which could have been the largest privatisa-
tion deal, should not override economic uncertainties con-
cerning the sale.
30 Oil in Lithuania is produced on a small but growing sca-
le by the Lithuanian-Danish Minijos Nafta, the Lithuanian-
-Swedish Genciu Nafta and by Geonafta, a company con-
trolled by the Naftos Gavyba consortium established by
two Lithuanian companies, Arada of Switzerland and Petro-
baltic and Energopol Trade of Poland. An oil exploration li-
cence covering the Klaipeda territory was also granted to
Manifoldas, a company controlled by the Russian-Lithu-
anian Stella-Vitae. 
In April 2002, Latvia granted the Norwegian-US TGS-Nopec
a 5-year licence for oil exploration in the Baltic Shelf. In
May 2002, the Ministry of Economy in Riga announced
a tender for a 30-year exclusive exploration licence cove-
ring the whole of LatviaÕsBaltic Shelf. (Odin Energy was the
only company that responded to the tender). Source: Baltic
Sea Region, Energy Information Agency, and An Energy
Overview of the Republic of Lithuania, US Department of
Energy.
31 For example, Russia offers Belarus the lowest gas prices
(presently, approx. US$ 30 per 1 thousand cubic metres).
Prices offered to Ukraine are higher (US$ 50), and the Baltic
States pay the highest rates (approx. US$ 80). Interfax, 
24 Sep. 2003.
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32 Apparently, this was the case of the leading Russian com-
panies that pressed Kyiv strongly and concordantly over
ÔtemporaryÕ use of the OdessaÐBrody pipeline for the trans-
port of Russian oil in the last months of 2003. According to
commentators, diverting the pipelineÕs direction would be
the beginning of the end of the idea to transport Caspian
oil to Europe and launch the CISÕ first major transport con-
nection independently of Russia. There are opinions that it
is doubtful if transporting Russian oil via the several hun-
dred kilometres longer route from Brody to Odessa would
be cost-effective. Another example of acting against the in-
t e rests of Russian companies, but consistent with Ru s-
s i a Õ s long-term strategy in the region, is MoscowÕs d e c i s i o n
to stop exporting oil v i a the Ventspils terminal. Ac c o rding to
Aivars Lembergs, one of Ru s s i a Õ s leading business partners
in Latvia, Russian oil companies are losing several million
dollars a day on this account. Commentators believe this to
be the necessary cost of the strategy intended to force La-
tvia to allow Russian companies to privatise the terminal.
33 One example of such contradictory signals is KyivÕsunde-
cided position on the future of the OdessaÐBrody pipeline.
Negative signals include the problems of BritainÕs JP Kenny
whom local partners tried to exclude from the jointly esta-
blished in 1994 business, UkraineÕs largest private gas pro-
ducing company. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair had
to intervene to protect JP KennyÕs interests in 2001. See 
Week in the East, CES, 12 Apr. 2001, Sd broni praw w¸as-
noæci najwi«kszego na Ukrainie inwestora brytyjskiego.
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Chapter 4. 
Foreign investments 
in the oil and gas sectors
of CIS energy producers
Iwona Wiæniewska
Following the collapse of the USSR, the newly
created states opened to Western investors. Ho-
wever, slow transformation and unfavourable
domestic conditions prevented significant fore-
ign direct investments (FDI) inflows. As of end-
2001, the CIS region as a whole attracted around
US$ 50 billion FDI, comparing to around US$ 130
billion in Central and Eastern Europe1. The bulk
of investments in the CIS area went to Russia,
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. These countries we-
re attractive to foreign investors for their natu-
ral wealth, especially their crude oil and natural
gas reserves. From investorsÕ point of view, the
energy wealth of this region might prove essen-
tial to the energy security of the Western mar-
kets. Development of a raw material base in the
CIS territory may guarantee stability of oil and
gas supplies through the diversification of mi-
ning sources, and through limiting the signifi-
cance of the instable Persian Gulf region for the
global oil markets. At the same time, CIS depo-
sits may ensure a continuity in supplies as the
natural reserves in other world regions (inclu-
ding the North Sea) are depleting, while the rich
gas resources in this region supported the pro-
spect for the implementation of EU plans to re-
duce Òblack energyÓ (coal and oil) consumption
and replace it with natural gas. 
As a consequence, the CIS region has attracted
interest of the largest world oil and gas compa-
nies, and key players in the international politi-
cal scene (USA, EU and the like). Yet, in many ca-
ses, the interests of the parties engaged have
turned out conflicting2, and the economic bene-
fits have been intermingled with political tar-
gets. This has had a negative impact on the de-
velopment of oil and gas projects in the region. 
1. Investment climate in energy
resource rich countries 
The realisation of the plans to boost3 production
and exports of energy raw materials in the CIS
region will largely depend on the influx of fore-
ign capital as domestic funds cannot fully satis-
fy the needs of this sector4.
All the CIS countries have gone through 10 years
of turbulent economic and political changes.
Particularly worth mentioning are the signifi-
cant transformations of the legislative base,
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aimed at creating laws that would be more
transparent and attractive to investors, which
have taken place during the last three years.
Such changes, however, have failed to set clear
and stable rules for running businesses. 
The most serious barriers to the influx of invest-
ments to these countries are: the instable legi-
slative base, strong links between the economy
and the politics, insufficient security of private
property rights, weak law enforcement, contra-
dictory legal regulations, corruption and crime.
Additional impediments include: long distances
to sale markets (of oil and gas), geopolitical po-
sition, lack of financing sources and concerns
about long-term economic and political stability.
Predictable rules of business activity are the pre-
condition for capital influx. This is particularly
important in the case of long-term (approx. half
a century) and capital-intensive investments as
oil and gas sector projects, which require setting
clear conditions of investment implementation.
One method of limiting the risk of projects in the
CIS region is to sign the so-called PSA (Produc-
tion Sharing Agreement), which is a contract be-
tween an investor and a government defining
conditions of operating the business. Agre-
ements of this kind, each concerning a particu-
lar natural resource project, are concluded be-
tween governments and investors (either fore-
ign or domestic). They determine stable condi-
tions of deposit development and exploitation,
and of profit allocation. These agreements are
long-term (25Ð40 years), and they intend to en-
sure predictable conditions for project imple-
mentation. Tax rules are subject to individual ne-
gotiations for each individual project5.
All of the oil and gas producers in the CIS region
have applied agreements of this kind to their na-
tural resources sectors and offered similar condi-
tions6. However, only a few countries, above all
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, have deemed PSA
beneficial for themselves and have decided to
use PSAs on a wider scale. As a result, these co-
untries have attracted relatively more invest-
ments than Russia or Turkmenistan, which pur-
sue a rather discouraging (in the case of Turkme-
nistan, extremely discouraging) policy towards
foreign investors. 
1.1. The situation of foreign investors
in Russia 
The conditions of investing in Russia as specified
in numerous legislative acts, have formally gi-
ven investors much freedom in their actions. Al -
ready in 1991, under the Investment Code, fore-
ign capital gained the same rights as Russian in-
vestors for their operations in Russia. Limita-
tions on foreign investments were only imple-
mented in some, yet important and attractive,
economic sectors. For instance a limit (11%) was
set on foreign ownership in Gazprom7, and it
was decided that the oil export network in the
Russian Federation could only be owned by sta-
te-owned Transneft. Apart from that, a prior per-
mit was required, among other things, in the ca-
se of foreign investments in deposit develop-
ment and in the case of all projects above certa-
in threshold (50 mln roubles)8.
The way in which the privatisation of the Rus-
sian oil and gas sector was conducted significan-
tly limited foreign investorsÕ access to that pro-
cess, and caused domination of this sector by
Russian entities or companies registered in the
so-called tax havens (predominantly of Russian
ownership as well). Despite this, following years
saw foreign investors entering the Russian natu-
ral re s o u rce market, among other measure s
through purchasing shares in enterprises in the
secondary market or through participation in
subsequent privatisations in the sector (as part-
ners in joint ventures with Russians). Yet, the po-
sition of foreign companies was weak, and in ma-
ny cases, being minority shareholders, they were
unable to enforce their rights and have their say
in the companiesÕ management9. Regardless of
their bad experience, foreign investors had not
lost their interest in Russian oil and gas sector.
As the situation in the country was stabilising,
they continued their expansion to this market
with increasing determination. 
Currently, almost all foreign investments in the
Russian oil sector operate under a licence gran-
ted for the development of an indicated field,
and are subject to general taxation and legal re-
gulations applicable in Russia. Foreign and do-
mestic investors alike have to apply for export
quotas and access to Transneft pipelines, pay
export duties on the crude oil and oil products
they export, etc. Additional risks include the tur-
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bulent Russian political scene and frequent legi-
slative innovations10. The Russian gas market,
monopolised by Gazprom, does not leave too
much room for private mining companies. Gaz-
prom is reluctant to give access to its transport
network to other companies, besides the rules of
such co-operation remain extremely obscure.
The idea of introducing production sharing agre-
ements into the Russian oil and gas sector emer-
ged already in the 1970Õs. The first negotiations
on PSAs were held with investors despite the
lack of proper legal regulations. It was only the
presidential decree of 1993 that permitted si-
gning such agreements. The PSA issue was sta-
tutorily regulated as late as in 1996, and works
on its amendment have continued since11. As it
stands, the PSA law has not really been imple-
mented as other legal regulations were not adju-
sted accordingly. As a consequence, no agre-
ement has been signed since the law on PSA was
passed12. The only three current PSA projects (Sa-
khalin-1, Sakhalin-2 and the Khariag field in the
Nenets Autonomous Area) function on the basis
of the 1993 decree. Numerous difficulties have
appeared during the implementation of these
projects13.
The particularly lengthy legislative process con-
cerning PSAs partly resulted from heavy lobby-
ing by political and business circles14, which op-
posed the introduction of PSAs as a popular
practice. It is an increasingly more common
view in Russia that offering special conditions to
investors at the present stage of economic deve-
lopment is no longer necessary to attract invest-
ments. At the same time, Russian authorities ar-
gue that the example of existing PSAs discoura-
ges the government from signing subsequent
contracts15.
The lack of MoscowÕs decision on the future of
PSAs holds back the FDI influx into the oil and
gas sector16. Many investors who bought licen-
ces for Russian deposits specified in the PSA law
in the mid 1990Õs have been delaying their pro-
ject implementation until authorities reach a fi-
nal decision. The 2003 amendments17 to the law
de facto limiting the possibility of signing PSAs
in Russia to a minimum, may cause foreign com-
panies to change their strategy and start inve-
sting according to the general rules. There is, ho-
wever, also a risk that deposit licences which ha-
ve not been used by their holders for a prolon-
ged period, could be withheld by the Russian Mi-
nistry of Natural Resources. 
The main obstacle to foreign companiesÕ opera-
tions in Russia is the state monopoly on trans-
port on the RF territory. The need to obtain con-
sent from Transneft or Gazprom to build alterna-
tive transportation networks (which in many ca-
ses is impossible) and the unclear mechanisms
for getting access to existing pipelines cast do-
ubts on the profitability of potential invest-
ments.
1.2. The situation of foreign investors
in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan was trying to create favourable con-
ditions for foreign investors, especially in the
raw material sector, already in the mid 1990Õs.
The act of 2003, which currently regulates the
investment law, has confirmed equal treatment
of both domestic and foreign investors, while
maintaining tax preferences and import duty
exemptions for imported equipment in case the-
re are no Kazakhstan-produced substitutes. The
new law also guarantees the stability of the si-
gned contracts execution conditions. However,
the law has limited the access to international
arbitration18 and failed to guarantee the respect
of such verdicts. 
Kazakhstan has a relatively liberal investment
law, still, like Russia, it has set limitations on fo-
reign ownership shares in some sectors of its
economy, e.g. banking, telecommunications. It is
also possible for the government to refuse fore-
ign investors national treatment in the raw ma-
terials sector. Additionally, investors, similarly as
in Russia, have been legally obliged to engage
domestic contractors in the projects by purcha-
sing goods and services from them. The largest
enterprises in which foreign investors have sta-
kes are monitored by state officials. Because the
government supervision rules are usually uncle-
ar and time-consuming, this procedure delays
investorsÕ decision-making. 
Fo reign companies have been given the oppor-
tunity to conduct projects in the raw materials
sector either under a licence for development of
a given deposit (such activity is subject to the
general tax and legal regulations) or under
PSAs, which have to be approved by the highest
authorities. The rather liberal approach of the
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authorities to foreign investors dating back to
the mid 1990Õs has tightened in the re c e n t
years. This is especially felt by consortiums
which are implementing production sharing
a g reements. The government has decided that
the state-owned concern KazMunaiGaz should
be the majority shareholder (51%) in any new
p roject. The authorities are also planning to
change the tax law and increase tax levies on oil
companies. 
Kazakh authorities, similarly to the Ru s s i a n
ones, argue increasingly more often that PSA is
not the best solution for Kazakhstan and that
deposit development according to the general
rules could yield much better results. No new
PSAs are likely to be concluded in Kazakhstan. 
Major impediments to investments in Kazakh-
stan include its geopolitical situation, which ma-
kes the raw materials less accessible to world
markets Ð there is no direct link to major oil
markets, and the Russian pipeline system must
be used. From the point of view of foreign inve-
stors, one of the main barriers to profitability of
prospective investments in the underdeveloped
gas sector (Kazakhstan is currently not a signifi-
cant net exporter of gas) is the transport mono-
poly held by Gazprom in this region. In the case
of Kazakhstan, the only export route goes thro-
ugh Russia and, furthermore, Kazakh gas can 
only be processed at the Orenburg gas proces-
sing plant (Russia). 
1.3. The situation of foreign investors
in Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan began creating a rather liberal inve-
stment law already in the early 1990Õs. Foreign
and domestic investorsÕ rights were equalised.
Still, specific restrictions were introduced on FDI
inflow in sectors such as oil, power engineering
and other important sectors which were rese-
rved for state-owned monopolies. Investments
in those industries were subject to approval by
the government or even by the president him-
self, and could be realised in joint ventures with
domestic partners only19.
Until the end of the 1990Õs, most enterprises in
the Azeri oil and gas sector were joint ventures
between foreign companies and the state-o w n e d
monopolist in the oil and gas sector, SOCAR, and
they were governed by the general tax and legal
regulations. The situation changed in 2000,
when the authorities decided to liquidate joint
ventures in the oil and gas sector and replace
them with production sharing agreements, cla-
iming that PSAs were the most beneficial way of
investing for both the investors and the state20.
Azerbaijan has no law to regulate the produc-
tion sharing agreements issues; each agreement
is individually negotiated and then ratified by
parliament. Part of the privileges provided for by
PSAs (including import duty exemptions) also
apply to the subcontractors and suppliers of oil
companies. 
The Azeri authorities has opened their oil and
gas sector to foreign investors, offering them
substantial freedom of action. They strongly
supported both deposit development and the
extension of Caucasian transit routes. A serious
obstacle21 in accessing some of the off-shore Ca-
spian Sea fields is the unresolved status of this
area. In 2002, Azerbaijan signed a delimitation
agreement with Russia, yet essential questions
concerning the division of the most disputed so-
uthern part of the waters have not been settled
with Iran and Turkmenistan. Investors also face
problems connected with the geopolitical situ-
ation of Azerbaijan, which has enormous signifi-
cance, especially in case of development of the
Caucasian transport routes. Although the go-
vernments of the countries involved are not cau-
sing any formal troubles for investors, the eth-
nic conflicts (e.g. the Nagorno-Karabakh or Ab-
khaz conflicts) pose a threat to the planned pipe-
lines in this region.
Currently, the development of the Azeri gas sec-
tor is seriously hampered by the lack of export
pipelines from the South Caucasus. The existing
Russian routes provide for supplies to the region
but not out of it. 
1.4. The situation of foreign investors
in Tu r k m e n i s t a n
Turkmenistan was trying to arouse foreign inve-
storsÕ interest in its natural resources, especially
in natural gas, in the mid 1990Õs. It even inclu-
ded laws on production sharing agreements in
its legislation, yet restrictions put on foreign in-
vestors discouraged them from involvement in
this country. Investors have no access to the
export network and thus no practical possibility
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of exports. All pipelines belong to state-owned
enterprises. Foreign companies can only sell raw
materials in the domestic market at prices regu-
lated by the authorities (which are much lower
than global prices)22.
As a consequence of such actions, according to
UNCTAD estimates23, only approx. US$ 1 billion
was invested in this country by the end of 2001,
90% of which went to the gas and oil sector. The
construction of the gas pipeline to Iran (in 1998)
and the growth of gas output in the recent years
were possible mainly thanks to state outlays and
not to foreign capital. Additionally, Turkmeni-
stan has limited access to consumers who are re-
ady to pay global prices for its gas. The limita-
tions put on gas transfer by Gazprom and the
small capacity of the pipeline going to Iran Ð the
only alternative to the Russian routes, impede
the development of the Turkmen gas sector.
2. Foreign investments 
in the region
2.1. Ru s s i a
The rather unfavourable climate for investments
which persists in Russia, has deterred inflows of
FDI. By the end of 2002, cumulative inflows amo-
unted to only US$ 22 billion (Table 1), or US$ 160
per capita , which compares to, respectively US$
45 billion and US$ 1,200 in Poland. The main in-
vestors include American companies, which ha-
ve laid out over US$ 4 billion, and Cypriot com-
panies24, which have invested US$ 3.6 billion.
Large investment stakes also fall to Dutch, Bri-
tish and German capital. 
Almost half of total FDI inflows (approx. US$ 10
billion; as per end of 2002) went into the Russian
oil and gas sector25. Over US$ 3 billion26 of that
amount was allocated for the Sakhalin projects,
and approx. US$ 2 billion was spent on the con-
struction of the TengizÐNovorossiysk Caspian 
pipeline (CPC).
All the large global companies are present in the
Russian market. Foreign investors mainly parti-
cipate in the most capital-intensive projects,
aimed at developing new deposits in Russia.
This characterises both the Sakhalin invest-
ments and the potential investment by BP in the
Kovykta gas field2 7. Western companies also
want to develop distribution networks for their
own products in Russia, and sell technologies
and facilities used by raw materials processing
plants (refineries, petrochemical plants) or by
enterprises producing equipment for the needs
of the sector.
Even though Western capital has played a key ro-
le in the implementation of most of Ru s s i a Õ s new
projects (e.g. the Blue Stream gas pipeline or CPC
oil pipeline), foreign involvement in the Russian
oil and gas sector (mining, exports) remains
small. Most of the projects which foreign compa-
nies take part in are currently in the initial pha-
se of implementation. As the Sakhalin projects
develop and BPÕs investments are made in TNK28,
the statistical data on foreign consortiums may
improve. Yet, escaping Russian domination in
this sector is rather impossible. It is the Russian
corporations that have a lionÕs share in raw ma-
terials production and exports, and rather high
oil and gas prices in recent years have enabled
them to accumulate enough capital to make
multibillion investments in the domestic oil and
gas sector. In 2000Ð2002, Russian oil companies
allocated more than US$ 5 billion for invest-
ments annually, most of which remained in the
domestic market29. A great majority of such out-
lays have, however, been invested in deposits
which are already being mined, and not in the
development of new ones. 
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Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
End-1996 stock
1.0
4.0
7.9
End-2002 stock
5.5
15.4
22.6
1 9 9 7
1.1
1.3
4.9
1 9 9 8
1.0
1.2
2.8
1 9 9 9
0.5
1.5
3.3
2 0 0 0
0.1
1.3
2.7
2 0 0 1
0.2
2.8
2.5
2 0 0 2
1.1
2.6
2.4
Source: UNCTAD 2003
Table 1. FDI inflows to selected CIS countries, 1996Ð2002 (US$ billion)
The BP has recently been one of the most active
investors in the Russian market. The corporation
has decided to strengthen its position in Russia
through a joint-venture with the Tyumen Oil
Company (TNK), the fourth largest oil company
in Russia. Relatively large capital has also been
invested in the Russian Federation by Shell,
which is engaged in the Sakhalin project and
which has a licence for the Salimskoye fields (in
the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area). 
2.2. Kazakhstan
According to UNCTAD data, by the end of 2002,
Kazakhstan received US$ 15.4 billion in foreign
direct investments, which is approximately US$
900 per capita. The main investors were the Uni-
ted States (approx. US$ 6 billion) and the United
Kingdom (over US$ 2 billion)30. Kazakhstan owes
such a relatively high FDI inflow (as compared to
Russia) to the opening of its oil and gas sector to
foreign investors and to offering them favoura-
ble business conditions. A majority of FDI, i.e.
approx. US$ 10 billion, went into the Kazakh oil
and gas sector31.
Fo reign investorsÕ goal is to develop the Ka z a k h
oilfields and extend its transportation pipelines.
The already invested capital has contributed to
i n c reasing production levels in the recent years.
In 2001, almost half of the oil output in Ka z a k h-
stan came from the fields exploited by internatio-
nal consortiums (mainly Tengiz). The share of fo-
reign investors in the Kazakh oil output will gro w
in subsequent years as the currently developed
p rojects enter the production phase (Table III). 
Oil exports to global markets and further deve-
lopment of the sector are going to be supported
by investments in the transportation infrastruc-
ture. The Tengiz field has already been linked to
Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast by CPC pipe-
line and a new oil pipeline has provided a con-
nection for Karachaganak to this route. Transfer
routes connecting the Kazakh pipelines with the
Russian transfer system (e.g. AtyrauÐSamara) are
being expanded, too.
Western companies are also interested in inve-
sting in the Kazakh petroleum refining industry.
One of the three existing refineries, in Shym-
kent, has already been bought by the Canadian
Hurricane Hydrocarbons, while the other two Ð
in Atyrau (currently being modernised by Japa-
nese companies) and in Pavlodar Ð are still state-
owned.
The American oil and gas concern, Chevro n Te x a-
c o, is the largest foreign investor in Ka z a k h s t a n .
It participates in key Kazakh oil projects (Te n g i z ,
Karachaganak, CPC), which has made it the lar-
gest oil producer in this country. The compa-
n yÕ s investments in Kazakhstan have exc e e d e d
US$ 2 billion. The importance of the Italian ENI
has grown throughout recent years. The compa-
ny is engaged in the Karachaganak project (its to-
tal outlays will reach US$ 1.6 billion) and in
works on the Kashagan deposit in the Caspian
Sea, which may prove a g reat success in the long
term (according to initial re s e a rch). ENI, like most
oil concerns present in Kazakhstan, is a s h a re h o l-
der in the CPC consortium (Table III). The Ka z a k h
m a r ket has also received more and more invest-
ments from the Chinese companies, which not
only engage in field development, but are also
planning to build a pipeline to their country.
Interestingly enough, there is only one Russian
company, LUKoil, which has invested approx.
US$ 1 billion32 in this market, thus placing itself
among the key foreign investors in Kazakhstan.
It exploits the Kumkol field jointly with Hurrica-
ne-Kumkol, has 15% stakes in Karachaganak,
and together with the American Arco, it is a mi-
nor shareholder (5%) in the consortium which is
developing Tengiz. 
Even though, according to estimates, Ka z a k h-
stan has quite vast gas re s e rves, its export le-
vels are low (Table VII). The investments made
so far in this sector have only caused a s l i g h t
g rowth in gas output. In 2002, Ka z Ro s G a z ,
a company founded by KazMunaiGaz and Gaz-
p rom, launched a p rogramme for the moderni-
sation and expansion of the Kazakh gas ne-
twork, estimated for US$ 0.5 billion. This invest-
ment is meant to help boost Kazakh gas pro d u c-
tion and to increase its transit capacity, so that
it could be used for transportation of Tu r k m e n
and Uzbek gas.
2.3. Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan ranks third among the CIS countries
in terms of the cumulated FDI inflows value. Ac-
cording to UNCTAD data as per end of 2002, the-
ir value reached US$ 5.5 billion. In per capita
terms this translates to around US$ 700, much
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above the level in Russia. The major investors in-
clude the United States and the United Kingdom,
each with a 25% share of all investments. A gre-
at role is also played by Turkish, Norwegian and
Russian capital. Azerbaijan, similarly to Kazakh-
stan, owes such a relatively intense inflow of fo-
reign investments to the opening of its oil and
gas sector to Western companies, for this sector
has absorbed almost 85% of all FDI in Azerbaijan
(approx. US$ 4.6 billion).
Like in Kazakhstan, Western companies33 began
operations in the South Caucasus by expanding
major oil pipelines. In the first stage of its activi-
ty in Azerbaijan, the consortium which Western
companies participated in, modernised the oil
pipeline going from Baku to the Georgian port of
Supsa. This pipeline was the first not to pass
through the Russian territory and it shortened
the oil transfer route to the Black Sea. Direct ac-
cess to the Mediterranean Sea and to global oil
consumers can only be ensured by the BakuÐTbi-
lisiÐCeyhan (BTC) pipeline project, which is being
implemented by Western companies, with great
support from the US Administration. Completion
of this transport route is scheduled for late 2004.
In the meantime, fields that will provide sup-
plies for the pipeline are going to be prepared for
exploitation. Western investors also hope that
the BTC can in future be used to transport the
Kazakh oil after a major boost in output there. In
recent years, Western companies have been mo-
re and more readily investing in enterprises ma-
nufacturing goods and rendering services for the
needs of the oil and gas sector. Such companies
as the American Halliburton or Norw a yÕ s Kvaerer
are already there. 
Thanks to foreign investments in the Azeri oil
sector, the production levels of this raw material
have risen. However, until 2002, more than half
of the oil mined in Azerbaijan was produced by
SOCAR.
Development of the gas sector is bound to be
another step towards strengthening the presen-
ce of foreign companies in Azerbaijan. Although
the country has quite rich gas reserves, its do-
mestic demand is met by imports from Russia to
a great extent. The key Azeri gas field, Shah De-
niz (Table III), which is now being developed,
may change the situation of Azerbaijan in the
nearest years. Yet, investors will have to wait for
commercial gas mining until the pipeline going
from Baku through Tbilisi to the Turkish Erzu-
rum34 is built. This should take place in 2006.
The project is being implemented by corpora-
tions35 which are also engaged in developing
Azeri deposits. The pipeline could also be used
in the future to export Turkmen gas. 
So far, BP has been the largest foreign investor in
Azerbaijan. The concern is the largest sharehol-
der in the consortium which struck the Azeri
Òdeal of the centuryÓ, concerning the AzeriÐChi-
ragÐGuneshli oilfield. BPÕs investments in the
project as per end of 2003 are estimated at ap-
prox. US$ 3.3 billion. The British company is al-
so engaged in the construction of the pipeline
going to Turkey (BTC). Apart from that, BP holds
25% of shares in the largest Azeri gas project,
Shah Deniz. 
3. Summary 
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan Ð major pro-
ducers of energy raw materials Ð have attracted
bulk of FDI inflows to the whole CIS region,
which nevertheless is not a lot in international
comparison. Majority of investments went to
the oil and gas sectors and in fact it was resour-
ce plenitude that attracted key global players to
the region. 
The investment inflows to particular countries
have been largely determined by policies to-
wards FDI. Russia, by far the largest and poten-
tially the most tempting market, has attracted
less investments than Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan
if measured in per capita terms. This is the direct
result of the privatisation of the oil sector in the
early 1990Õs, the authoritiesÕ hesitations in defi-
ning conditions for investments in the raw ma-
terials sector, and the state monopoly over oil
and gas transport, along with an unclear mecha-
nism of access to the pipelines. As a consequen-
ce, the foreign share in the Russian energy raw
materials production and exports remains insi-
gnificant. Additionally, such modest investments
in the Russian domestic transport infrastructure
pose a threat to the security of raw materials
transport in the future, especially in light of the
expected production boost. 
Kazakh and Azeri authorities have adopted quite
a different policy. These countries have decided
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to open their raw materials sector to foreign ca -
pital, offering the companies much freedom of
action. Foreign investors have contributed to the
increase of crude oil output in these countries
and to the development of their transport infra-
structure, enabling exports of raw materials. Ho-
wever, the rather complicated geopolitical situ-
ation and domestic policy of these countries de-
lay or even impede the realisation of investment
projects. 
The gas sector in the CIS is still being controlled
by Gazprom, which, due to its transport mono-
poly and strong informal links with the Russian
elites, is able to affect the development rate of
this sector in the region. Breaking Gaz-
promÕs monopoly may prove extremely difficult,
if not impossible, in the nearest years.
Most foreign investment projects in the three co-
untries under discussion have only entered ini-
tial implementation phases. Achieving the peak
output for these deposits is a matter of the next
5Ð10 years. Yet, further multibillion investments
are needed to reach the goal.
To succeed, many enterprises in the Caspian re-
gion also need confirmation of the initial estima-
tes of oil ang gas stocks and, above all, good po-
litical will of the authorities governing the re-
gion. Foreign companiesÕ plans to diversify the
transportation network in CIS territory are at va-
riance with Russian objectives. This conflict of
interest may either cause delay in the projectsÕ
realisation or curtail their profitability.
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Chapter 5. Oil and gas
wealth Ð the impact on
development prospects
of CIS countries
Wojciech Pa c z y Ä s k i
I n c reasing oil revenues do not imply increasing wealth.
Ð Svein Gjedrem, governor, Norwegian Central Bank
Our country is rich, but our people are poor.
Ð Vladimir Putin, president of Russia1
In this paper we look at the impact from the
energy resource wealth to development pro-
spects of Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) countries. We present evidence on the im-
portance of oil and gas sectors for the selected
CIS economies and highlight the chances and ri-
sks to economic growth and social progress that
are related to the abundance of oil and gas. The
discussion concerns both long term trends and
short term policy dilemmas. The major conclu-
sion is that while vast deposits of energy com-
modities create a chance for faster growth and
reduction of poverty they also generate a num-
ber of problems for economic and social policies.
Given the current condition of state institutions
and political situation in CIS countries one sho-
uld be very cautious in presenting overly optimi-
stic scenarios. Despite the positive short-term
outlook, there is a risk that some resource rich
countries might fail to make best use of the we-
alth hidden below their soil.
The introductory section briefly describes the
evidence from resource-rich countries indicating
that oil wealth turned out to be a curse rather
than blessing in a number of cases. In the se-
cond part the role of commodities sector in the
economies of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
is discussed and some ensuing policy challenges
are presented. Concluding part considers deve-
lopment outlook of the analysed countries. 
1. The Òresource curseÓ Ð 
historical evidence
The deposits of natural resources should be nor-
mally expected to boost wealth and to countries
where they happen to be located thus bringing
them prosperity. Yet, the development experien-
ce of countries with significant natural resource
reserves is disappointing. One does not observe
a positive relationship between abundance of
oil, gold, diamonds, etc. and economic growth. If
anything, there seem to be evidence that coun-
tries blessed by nature on average perform wor-
se than countries without any sizeable natural
resource deposits. The blessing can in fact beco-
me a curse. Certainly, there is a substantial varia-
tion in experience of particular countries. One
success story often referred to in literature is
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diamonds-rich Botswana which has had the hi-
ghest rate of per capita growth of any country in
the world for the last 35 years2. However, the
examples of catastrophic development outco-
mes in countries with natural resources depo-
sits, particularly oil, seem to be more typical3.
Several hypotheses were proposed trying to
explain such outcomes. 
The first such hypothesis is commonly referred
to as ÒDutch DiseaseÓ. The basic mechanism can
be described as follows. An increase in resource-
based revenues of the country (from oil and gas
exports) leads to increased income in the coun-
try and consequently higher demand. Part of
that demand boost is concentrated on the dome-
stic non-tradeables. This results in an increase of
prices of non-tradeables relative to tradeables
(since the price of tradeables is fixed internatio-
nally), that is an appreciation of the real exchan-
ge rate. Consequently, domestic production reso-
urces (labour) are shifted from the domestic tra-
dable sector (non-resource industry) towards the
sector producing non-tradeables (primarily se-
rvices). As a result domestic tradable sector
shrinks4.
For this story to explain the overall poor growth
performance of energy-rich countries one needs
some additional assumptions such as more pro-
nounced increasing returns in manufacturing re-
lative to the resource related sectors or higher
productivity growth in manufacturing relative
to other sectors. There are still many contro v e r-
sies whether the ÒDutch DiseaseÓ mechanism can
indeed be considered an important mechanism
behind the resource curse evidence5.
Yet another set of explanations highlights the im-
pact of volatility of commodity prices as an im-
portant factor hindering growth. Indeed, one of
the standard stylised facts of commodities is that
their prices tend to exhibit higher volatility than
prices of manufactured goods and that if any-
thing this volatility has increased in the last two
decades or so6. Terms of trade shocks stemming
f rom international commodity pricesÕ fluctu-
ations certainly pose a challenge to macro e c o n o-
mic polices but the whole mechanism should ra-
ther be seen as acting on top of other channels.
One hypothesis that has received increased at-
tention recently is that the abundance of natural
resources tends to have a detrimental effect on
the quality of state institutions that in turn ap-
pear to be important determinants of economic
development. Empirical evidence seems to con-
firm the negative impact from fuels and other
mineral resources to the quality of institutions.
Other natural resources (e.g. agricultural ones)
do not appear to impair on the quality of institu-
tions. Fuel minerals are particularly likely to cre-
ate conditions for lobbying for and allocation of
the rents. This might be due to the fact that such
resources are location-specific, involve large ini-
tial investments but are characterised by low la-
bour and other costs of operations once the in-
frastructure is already in place. The secure rights
to infrastructure (oil or gas fields themselves
and transportation infrastructure) are a vital
condition for securing revenues to finance initial
investments7.
2. FSU country studies
In this section we highlight some specific macro-
economic issues in selected energy rich CIS co-
untries that could help in relating the Òre s o u rc e
curseÓ literature to the specific situation of these
post-communist economies and form a basis for
an outlook presented in the concluding section.
2.1. The relative size of the oil 
and gas sector 
The precise estimation of the share of the oil and
gas sector in the economies of Russia, Kazakh-
stan and Azerbaijan is difficult, though there is
little controversy that it is very substantial. The
major problem in estimating the numbers is
that there are strong links with other sectors
providing supporting goods and services (e.g.
constructions works). This can be clearly illu-
strated by the examples of Kazakhstan and Azer-
baijan where the oil sectors are at the early sta-
ge of development and thus demand high inve-
stment. The relative boom in constru c t i o n ,
transportation and other services largely owes
to demand created by oil and gas investment
projects and fluctuates along the timing of spe-
cific development phases. For example building
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of the BakuÐSupsa pipeline brought the con-
struction sectorÕs share in Azerbaijani GDP to
well above 10% in 1998Ð1999 before it fell to 6%
of GDP in 2001.
No reliable estimate of the oil and gas share in
total value added in the economy was available
for Russia. In Kazakhstan, IMF estimates indica-
te that the share of oil sector in the broad sense
in total value added increased from below 10%
in 1998 to close to 20% in 2000Ð2001 and above
20% in 20028. In Azerbaijan, rising oil explora-
tion and exports (1998Ð1999) and increase in the
global prices for these commodities (2000Ð2002)
brought the sectorÕs share in the whole economy
up from 11% in 1998 to around 30% in 2000Ð
Ð2002 (Table 1). Given the development of new
projects the upward trend is very likely to conti-
nue in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Russia has
more mature oil and gas sector and one should
expect that price fluctuations will have a major
impact on the share in total value added. 
An expansion of oil and gas sectors was one of
the major driving forces of economic growth dri-
vers in all three analysed countries during
1999Ð2003. Again, the precise estimates are dif-
ficult to obtain for Russia9. In Kazakhstan, oil
sector exhibited very high rates of gro w t h ,
expanding by some 140% in 1998Ð2002, compa-
red to over 20% in the non-oil sector. Still, non-
-oil sector contributed slightly more to overall
GDP growth over that period than did the oil
sector. In Azerbaijan, non-oil part of the econo-
my was in recent years expanding faster than
the (narrowly defined) oil sector. However, once
we exclude the services sector (booming in re-
sponse to demand from developing oil projects)
it is evident that non-oil industry has been on
the decline.
Clearly, the share of the sector in the total value
added is not the only indication of the importan-
ce of energy commodities for the whole econo-
my. Other important indicators are provided by
the commodity structure of foreign trade, by the
composition of fiscal revenues and an impact on
macroeconomic policies, in particular monetary
policy.
2.2. Foreign trade structure
Oil and gas currently dominate in the export
s t ru c t u re making up between 50% (Ka z a k h s t a n )
and above 90% (Azerbaijan) of total exports of the
analysed countries. As illustrated in Table 2 these
s h a res have increased dramatically since mid-
1 9 9 0 s as a result of a combination of three pro c e s-
ses: rising commodity export volumes, falling or
stagnant other exports and an increase in inter-
national oil prices that occurred in 2000Ð20031 0. 
In all three countries export volumes of energy
commodities are expected to be rising during
the next several years, particularly in Kazakh-
stan (doubling of export volumes expected be-
tween 2002 and 2009) and Azerbaijan (in this ca-
se the peak in production is expected around
2008Ð2010). The development of international
prices cannot be predicted but the consensus ap-
pears to be that average oil prices should fall
from very high levels observed in 2000 and ear-
ly 2001 and then again from late 2002 up till pre-
sent (late 2003). There are no reasons to expect
reduced volatility of prices. In particular one
cannot exclude a deep and prolonged drop in
prices, such as the one observed in 1998 and ear-
ly 1999. Consequently, revenues from oil and gas
exports will inevitably remain uncertain. From
the perspective of the whole economies it is par-
ticularly important that other non-commodity
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Industry & construction
Of which: oil and gas sector
Agriculture
Other
1 9 9 8
35
11
18
47
1 9 9 9
39
20
18
43
2 0 0 0
42
30
16
42
2 0 0 1
43
32
15
42
2 0 0 2
46
29
14
40
Source: IMF, Azerbaijan country reports (various issues).
Table 1. Structure of GDP in Azerbaijan, 1998Ð2002 (% of GDP)
sectors maintain their competitiveness. In this
respect the evidence from 1995Ð2003 is generally
disappointing (see Table 2). Figure 1 presents the
developments in Russia. It is striking to see the
value of non-energy exports being stagnant 
(in US$ terms) over the whole 1994Ð2003 period
despite the major swings in the real effective
exchange rate of the rouble. Some increase visi-
ble in late 2002 and early 2003 is in part simply
explained by the depreciation of the dollar ver-
sus the euro.
The situation in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan was
similar. The overall growth in exports can be so-
lely attributed to the growth in the value of oil
and oil product exports. An unfavourable busi-
ness climate remains one of the major reasons
behind such weak results. 
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Russia
Merchandise exports
Of which: oil&gas exports
Of which: other exports
Merchandise imports
Kazakhstan
Merchandise exports
Of which: oil&gas exports
Of which: other exports
Merchandise imports
Azerbaijan
Merchandise exports
Of which: oil exports
Of which: other exports
Merchandise imports
1 9 9 5
82
30
52
63
..
..
..
6.7
0.68
0.34
0.35
0.96
1 9 9 6
90
38
52
68
..
..
..
5.6
0.79
0.55
0.24
1.34
1 9 9 7
87
38
48
72
..
..
..
6.9
0.81
0.48
0.33
1.38
1 9 9 8
74
28
47
58
5.9
1.7
4.2
7.6
0.68
0.45
0.23
1.72
1 9 9 9
76
31
45
40
6.1
2.2
4.0
7.7
1.03
0.80
0.22
1.43
2 0 0 0
105
53
52
45
9.5
4.4
5.0
6.7
1.80
1.52
0.28
1.54
2 0 0 1
102
52
50
54
9.1
4.5
4.7
5.6
2.05
1.84
0.21
1.47
2 0 0 2
107
56
51
61
10.2
5.2
5.0
6.9
2.31
2.05
0.26
1.82
Source: IMF Country reports, various issues (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) and Central Bank of Russia.
Table 2. Commodity structure of foreign trade, 1995Ð2002 (US$ billion)
Figure 1. RussiaÕs quarterly exports Ð four quarter moving averages, 1994Ð2Q 2003 (US$ billion)
Source: Own calculations based on CBR balance of payment data.
2.3. Budget structure, fiscal policies
and quasi-fiscal operations
Oil and gas related revenues constitute an im-
portant part of budget revenues in the analysed
countries. In 2001Ð2002, on average they made
23% of the total in Kazakhstan, 39% in Russia
and 50% in Azerbaijan. These figures should be
treated with caution and no simple cross-coun-
try comparisons are possible since the differen-
ces to some extent stem from diverse classifica-
tions and one-off events (e.g. large bonus pay-
ments). 
Such high shares clearly imply high sensitivity of
total fiscal revenues and fiscal position to the
global oil prices. In Russia, recent estimates indi-
cate that on average the 1 US$/bbl change in in-
ternational oil prices affects fiscal revenues to
the tune of 0.4Ð0.45% of GDP11. Some tax chan-
ges introduced in 2002 and modifications propo-
sed in 2003 could lead to a further strengthening
of the relationship between oil prices and bud-
get revenues. At present, the tax burden on the
oil and gas industries is much heavier than in
other sectors of the economy. Such a policy, whi-
le possibly giving some support to non-oil eco-
nomy, could also worsen the risks of macroeco-
nomic destabilisation. In Kazakhstan and Azer-
baijan where large oil-related money is a new
phenomenon its management is particularly dif-
ficult. For instance, Kazakhstan has apparently
continued with too tight fiscal policies in 2002Ð
Ð2003 when non oil deficit was small and falling
despite major financing needs in the spheres of
health, education and social safety nets. 
The volatility of oil related budget revenues po-
se a challenge to the conduct of fiscal policies in
the medium term. An oil fund could be used as
a tool for smoothing the stream of revenues or
for intergenerational transfers of oil money.
Such funds have been established in Kazakhstan
(mainly to fulfil the first function) and Azerba-
ijan (mainly for intergenerational transfers).
Still, there are some problems in the functioning
of the funds. For example, there is no law gover-
ning the Azerbaijani fund which has so far ope-
rated purely on the basis on presidential decre e s .
Despite IMFÕs suggestions the authorities rejec-
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Russia (federal budget)
Total revenue
Total oil revenue
Total non oil revenue
non oil balance
Kazakhstan (general budget)
Total revenue
Total oil revenue
Total non oil revenue
non oil balance
Azerbaijan
Total revenue
Total oil revenue
Total non oil revenue
1 9 9 8
19.5
3.8
15.7
1 9 9 9
17.5
1.0
16.5
-6.0
18.1
4.2
14.0
2 0 0 0
15.4
5.5
9.9
-4.7
21.7
3.3
18.4
-4.1
20.7
7.5
13.2
2 0 0 1
17.6
6.5
11.1
-3.7
25.6
6.6
19
-3.9
21.4
9.4
12.0
2 0 0 2 E
17.1
7.0
10.1
-5.8
22.6
4.4
18.2
-3.0
27.8
15.5
12.3
2 0 0 3 P
17.7
8.0
9.7
-5.1
Notes: E Ð estimate, P Ð projections.
In Kazakhstan oil revenue consists of CIT, royalties, PSA and bonus payments and local taxes. Volatility of oil 
revenue item partly reflects the timing of large bonus receipts (e.g. these were high in 2001).
In Azerbaijan, the jump in revenues (concentrated on the oil part) between 2001 and 2002 is largely attributable 
to the explicit inclusion of SOCAR energy related subsidies on the expenditure part of the budget and corresponding
entry of tax credit for SOCAR energy subsidies on the revenue side (in 2002 these amounted to 5.4% of GDP).
Source: IMF, country reports (various issues).
Table 3. Structure of budget revenues, 1998Ð2002 (% of GDP)
ted the necessity for introducing legal regula-
tions. Given the potential instability on the do-
mestic political scene the vulnerability of such
a solution is obvious Ð even though the creation
of the fund has clearly brought much more
transparency to managing the oil wealth and
the fiscal policies in general.
The energy sectors are at the early stages of re-
form in all three countries. In particular, dome-
stic prices of oil, gas, products thereof, electrici-
ty, etc. are generally much below levels consi-
stent with functioning markets. This clearly cre-
ates distorted incentives for economic agents
and has led to unusually high energy intensity,
suboptimal technology choices, too high and
wasteful consumption, too low investment in
energy infrastructure, exploration and conserva-
tion and distorted decisions concerning invest-
ments in transport infrastructure (pipelines)12.
Artificially low domestic prices mean that ener-
gy companies continue to function as quasi-fi-
scal institutions, providing implicit subsidies to
households and enterprises. Such quasi-fiscal ac-
tivities of energy companies give rise to certain
distortions and inefficiencies in economies and
act as additional detriments to reforms since
low energy prices are a substitute for social safe-
ty nets13. They also cause difficulties for the con-
duct of fiscal policies and might add to risks of
macroeconomic destabilisation. In particular the
observed changes in the registered fiscal stance
might not provide a viable description of the re-
ality if they are accompanied by (difficult to me-
asure) amendments in quasi-fiscal operations of
the energy sector.
To get an idea of the scale of the problem one co-
uld look at the example of Azerbaijan where total
e n e rgy sector (including oil, gas and electricity)
revenues have been lowered by as much as 27%
of GDP in 1999 due to implicit subsidies primari-
ly taking the form of mispricing. The energy sec-
tor reforms implemented more recently appear
to have been successful in bringing more trans-
p a rency and reducing the size of fiscal and quasi-
- f i s c a l subsidies from the sector to an estimated
11% of GDP in 2002 and expected even lower 
figure in 2003. In particular, the domestic fuel
prices were largely brought to estimated long-
run international levels and 2003 budget inclu-
des explicit subsidies for companies to buy oil
from SOCAR at international prices14.
2.4. Monetary and exchange rate 
policy dilemmas
Large oil and gas export revenues imply an im-
provement in the balance of payment position
and should normally induce appreciation of do-
mestic currencies. While this is expected to lead
to more efficient allocation of resources and to
allow for spreading oil benefits to the popula-
tion, domestic manufacturing sector might find
itself in a difficult position as domestically pro-
duced goods are becoming more expensive rela-
tive to goods produced abroad. Manufacturing
sector thus needs to improve its competitive-
ness by rising productivity, cutting costs or lo-
wering margins. While this is a typical market
situation affecting companies in all countries
a vital prerequisite for success is a business
friendly environment. The problem of the three
analysed countries is that local conditions for
entrepreneurial activities are very difficult, to
say the least.
The authorities in all three countries fearing
that appreciation of real exchange rate would
hamper manufacturing sector choose the strate-
gy of de facto exchange rate targeting rather
than going ahead with structural reforms. The
nominal exchange rates of the rouble, tenge and
manat were steered by interventions of the cen-
tral bank (on both sides of the market, but usu-
ally taking the form of preventing the apprecia-
tion pressure, i.e. buying foreign currencies).
These strategies proved successful to the extent
that nominal exchange rates have remained in
the planned territory. The major problem with
such a policy is that one loses the effective con-
trol over money stock and thus on inflation. In-
terventions of the central banks (particularly lar-
ge in Russia) meant the rapid monetary expan-
sion and were the major factor fuelling infla-
tion15. Inflation fell to visibly lower levels in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan due to a combina-
tion of several factors. Fiscal policies in Kazakh-
stan were tighter than in Russia (non-oil deficit
was declining in recent years, in contrast to Rus-
sia) and the oil fund helped in absorbing part of
oil revenues. Also, the financial sector reforms
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have stimulated high growth of monetisation in
Kazakhstan. Finally, since the oil and gas sectors
are still at the early stage of development in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan absorption of reve-
nues from energy commodities is facilitated by
large investment needs and investment related
imports.
The last three years saw broadly stable or even
depreciating real exchange rates of the three oil
exporting countries. Over the longer horizon
this is clearly unsustainable and would also be
inefficient. If the authorities continue with con-
trolling the nominal exchange rates, the pressu-
res for real exchange rate appreciation will lead
to higher inflation. A return of the real exchange
rate to the equilibrium territory via an adjust-
ment of prices would be more costly to the eco-
nomy than a nominal appreciation16. This view
seems to be gaining some understanding in the
authorities of the three countries (particularly in
Kazakhstan) and over a medium term horizon
one should expect strengthening of domestic
currencies (in both nominal and real terms). This
should act as yet another incentive for structu-
ral reforms aimed at boosting the competitive-
ness of the non-energy sector.
3. Development prospects of
energy rich FSU countries
Abundance of energy resource might be a pro-
blematic thing but this does not indicate that co-
untries with rich oil reserves should be expected
to perform weak at all times. The historical evi-
dence clearly indicates that their growth perfor-
mance is strongly positively linked to the inter-
national oil market. Oil exporting economies we-
re able to save more and grow faster than other
developing countries in the period when oil was
growing fast (1960Ð1980)17. In this light, it is not
surprising to see economies of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan expanding by above 10% annually
in 2000Ð2003, with Russia re c o rding only slightly
lower growth figures. 
Given the existing energy resource potential and
infrastructure (including projects currently be-
ing implemented) the oil and gas sectors in all
t h ree countries should be expected to expand fur-
ther in the coming years. In the case of Ka z a k h-
stan and especially Azerbaijan it will almost cer-
tainly imply a visible rise in the importance o f
the energy re s o u rce sector relative to the rest of
the economy. Such a t rend is also likely to appear
in Russia though, given its initial conditions, Ru s-
sia clearly has much better chances of developing
s t rong non-oil sectors of the economy.
It remains uncertain whether the three coun-
tries will be able to maintain strong overall eco-
nomic growth and even if so whether this will
benefit all strata of the societies. Optimistic
short-term prospects (particularly in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan where new projects enter the
production phase) do not guarantee the long run
success. Even in the best scenario the oil sector
is set to remain volatile, mirroring the develop-
ments in the world oil prices. Consequently, the
strength of the non-energy sector and effective
macroeconomic policies are vital for smoothing
personal incomes, employment and private con-
sumption. These are also crucial for a gradual re-
duction of the currently widespread poverty18.
Weakness of state institution, deficiencies in the
functioning of democracy and other unfavoura-
ble political developments appear to constitute
the major risk to development prospects of all
energy rich FSU countries. It is striking to com-
pare the numerous examples of failure in oil-rich
developing countries where centralisation of po-
wer, corruption and lack of efficiently functio-
ning state resulted in wasting of the enormous
oil wealth with the current trends observed in
FSU. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have had the
same leaders since independence, in Russia the
only change that was due to YeltsinÕs health pro-
blems. Importantly, the specific nature of the oil
business makes foreign investors (in countries
where they play a major role, i.e. Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan) to prefer political stability (and sta-
bility of their contracts) over functioning demo-
cracy and thus make the political development
more difficult. It is very instructive to look at the
reaction of major foreign investors in Azerbaijan
to an attempt to secure the succession of power
from president Heydar Aliev to his son in sum-
mer 2003. The experience of many other coun-
tries also indicates that the presence of oil will
make building of efficient state institutions mo-
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re difficult and this in turn will negatively im-
pact economic growth prospects of these coun-
tries. 
There are several mechanisms that will likely im-
pair institutional development of the countries
considered19. First, since extraction of natural re-
sources such as oil is very easily taxed, the in-
centives to tax the rest of the society are lower,
the society has less incentive to control what the
state does with the taxes and the government
has financial means to limit its democratic con-
trol (by buying off critics, providing grants to
certain groups or direct repression). ÒThe reve-
nues a state collects, how it collects them, and
the uses to which it puts themÓ does indeed Òde-
fine its natureÓ20. Second, modernisation of the
states will likely be slowed down as post-com-
munist elites who hold power in all major FSU
oil exporting countries appear to concentrate on
extracting rents from easy sources such as oil
and do not invest in building efficient state insti-
tutions21. All powerful agents (ruling elite and
foreign investors) have incentives to strengthen
the state but not necessarily the societies. Thir-
dly, the social structure is affected as rents from
natural resources such as oil accrue to a small
factions of the society and vertical social rela-
tionships emerge in which the majority is reliant
on assistance decided by the ruling elite rather
than the horizontal relationships of equality and
competition between many small producers of
some goods22.
Countries do not choose their resource endow-
ments and while oil and gas offer a great poten-
tial for social and economic development (the
example of Norway and other countries) it is by
no means easy to manage the wealth. States of
the former Soviet Union share Ð to various
extents Ð some characteristics that make this
management particularly difficult. On the other
hand, compared to many developing countries
they are initially richer, have better educated so-
cieties and an experience of expanding large ma-
nufacturing sector. These factors should act to
their advantage. Given the importance of effi-
ciency of state institutions for development pro-
spects it appears vital that existing laws concer-
ning economic activity are made as simple as 
possible, thus making the policy management
relatively easy. Some recent reforms e.g. in Ru s s i a
(simplification of the tax system) seem to be go-
ing in the right direction. Only simple, transpa-
rent and stable legal environment will make the
implementation of existing regulations possible
and thus conducive to social and economic deve-
lopment. 
Wojciech PaczyÄski
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sing and condensation plants, transport enter-
prises, which manage the export routes and lo-
cal gas pipeline mains, trading companies,
scientific institutes and construction organisa-
tions. Gazprom holds 100% of shares in most of
them. The whole structure is managed from its
Moscow-based headquarters. Moreover, the mo-
nopolist holds majority share blocks (over 50%)
in 44 enterprises that co-operate with the gas
industry: chemical and petrochemical plants,
metal ore enrichment plants, steelworks and pi-
pe manufacturers, machine industry plants, etc.
The concern holds stakes of less than 50% sha-
res in 69 corporations and companies, including
banks, the mass media, exchanges, insurance
companies, shopping centres, foreign compa-
nies, and above all in enterprises specialising in
gas transport and trade in most European coun-
tries Ð GazpromÕs contractors. 
Gazprom owns almost the whole of the gas pi-
peline network in the Russian Federation (149
thousand of the 150 thousand km stretch) as
well as its infrastructure: underground tanks,
compressor stations, etc. 
Enterprises owned by the monopolist hold licen-
ces for reserves holding a total of approx. 30 tril-
lion cubic metres of natural gas. Apart from that,
the concern is the sole coordinator of gas
exports and the only gas exporter to Central and
Western Europe. 
1 All the data on Transneft Ð www.transneft.ru. Transneft is
a joint-stock company. As a result of the limited privatisa-
tion 25% of its stocks (non-voting shares) were distributed
among its employees, and the other 75% are still owned by
the state. 
2 The Russian oil transport system includes, among others,
an. approx. 49 thousand km long network of pipelines, re-
serve containers of a nearly 13 million cubic metres capaci-
ty and 387 oil intermediate pumping stations (data from
the 2002 annual report). 
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Attachment 1
The Russian fuel sector
1. Oil sector structure 
The Russian oil sector is almost entirely privati-
sed. The state owns now only one oil company,
Rosneft (100% of shares) and minority shares in
several other companies (including in LUKoil Ð
7.6% of shares). Approx. 150 companies of vario-
us sizes, including several Gazprom-controlled
mining enterprises, operate in this sector. Ne-
vertheless, it is the seven giants that decide on
its condition and development: LUKoil, Yukos,
Surgutneftegas, Tyumen Oil Company (TNK), Sib-
neft, Rosneft and Tatneft. All are joint-stock com-
panies, with small or large foreign capital share
(except for the state-owned Rosneft). They all
form vertically integrated structures, which ha-
ve their own mining and processing enterprises
(refineries, petrochemical plants) and filling sta-
tion networks. As a general rule, they also have
financial (banks, investment funds, insurance
companies) and scientific bases (research and
project centres) as well as their own means of
transportation (including tanker fleets, rail
tanks stock) etc. 
Apart from these, the Russian FederationÕs oil
sector structure includes the state-owned trans-
port company, Transneft1, which is the sole
owner of and decision-maker for the entire pipe-
line network and almost all oil terminals in Rus-
sia. The company also acts as the general coordi-
nator of oil exports. Transneft pipelines2 carry
99% of all crude oil mined in Russia (e.g. in 2002,
approx. 373 million tons). Leaving the monopoly
in the hands of Transneft is, for Moscow, one of
the most effective ways to control the domestic
oil sector.
2. Gas sector structure 
The Russian gas sector is monopolised. Gaz-
prom, which is the dominating and currently ti-
ghtly state-controlled company, has a nearly
90%-share in Russian gas production (the rema-
ining little more than 10% are mined by inde-
pendent enterprises and oil companies). The
Russian gas monopoly is centralised. It compri-
ses mining companies, gas purification, proces-
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Company
GHW
Belgazprombank
Brestgazoapparat
Topenergo
Eesti Gaas
Gasum Oy
North Transgas Oy
FRAgaz
Prometheus Gaz
Peter-Gaz
Stella-Vitae
Lietuvos dujos
Kaunas electric 
power plant
Latvijas Gaze
Gazsnabtransit
Ditgaz
Verbundnetz Gas
Wingas
Wintershall Erdgas 
Handelshaus
Zarubezgas Erdgashandel
Europol Gaz
Gas Trading
WIROM
JugoRosGaz
Progress Gas Trading
Slovrusgaz
Host country
Austria
Belarus
Belarus
Bulgaria
Estonia
Finland
Finland
France
Greece
Holland
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
Latvia
Moldavia
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Poland
Poland
Romania
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Slovakia
shares % 
50
34.99
51
50
30.6
25
50
50
50
51
30
pursues to buy
34% shares
51
(due to rise to 99)
16.25
50
49
5.3
35
50
100
48
35
25**
50
50
50
Activity
gas trading
banking 
gas equipment 
manufacturing 
gas trading and transit
gas trading and transport
gas distribution and transport
gas pipeline construction
under the Baltic Sea 
gas trading
marketing and construction
gas trading
gas trading
gas distribution (monopolist)
electric power production
gas trading and transport
gas trading and transport 
gas trading
gas transport and marketing
gas transport and storage
exclusive trader until 2012 for all 
the gas exported by Gazexport (RF)
gas trading
gas transport
gas trading
gas trading
gas trading and transport
gas trading
gas trading and transport 
Table I. Ð Gazprom: selected equity investment outside the Russian Federation by mid 2003
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Sources: World Investment Report 2001, UNCTAD, news agencies 2003.  
* Financial investments through Milford Holdings Ltd. (Ireland)
** Controlled through Wintershall Handelshaus.
Company
Tagdem
Gamma Gazprom
Druzhovsky zavod
gazovoy aparatury
Institut Yuzhniigiprogaz
Borsodchem
DKG-EAST Co. Inc.
General Banking and 
Trust Co. Ltd. 
Panrusgas
TVK
Interconnector
Promgaz
Volta
Host country
Slovenia
Turkey
Ukraine
Ukraine
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
United Kingdom
Italy
Italy
shares % 
7.6
45
51
40
25*
38.1
25.5
40
13.5*
10
50
49
Activity
gas trading
gas trading
gas equipment 
manufacturing
research institute
petrochemical plant
oil and gas equipment
manufacturing
banking 
gas trading and transport
petrochemical 
Bacton (UK) Ð Zeebrugge (Belgium) 
gas pipeline operator 
gas trading and marketing
gas trading and transport
Table I. Ð Gazprom: selected equity investment outside the Russian Federation by mid 2003 (2)
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Oil company
LUKoil
Yukos
Tyumen Oil
Company (TNK)
SIBUR
Tatneft
Company
LUKArco
LUKAgip
LUKoilÐBelarus
AO LUKoilÐ
Neftochim-Burgas
LUKoil Eesti
Karachaganak
Integrated
Organization
LUKArco
LUKoil-Kumkol
LUKoil Baltija
AO Petrotel-LUKoil
Beopetrol
OAO LUKoil Ð
Odessky NPZ
ZAO Lukor 
Getty Petroleum
Marketing Inc.
Petrol A.D.
Mazeikiu nafta 
Kvaener 
Transpetrol
AO ãLiNOSÓ
Borsodchem Ð
Moravske
Chemicke Zavody
Borsodchem
ZAO Ukrtatnafta 
in Kremenchug
Host 
country
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Estonia
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Romania
Serbia
Ukraine
Ukraine
USA
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Norway
Slovakia
Ukraine
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Ukraine
shares % 
54
50
N/A
58
100
15
54%
N/A
51
79.5
100
50
100
51
53.7
22
49
67
9 7 . 5
held by
Borsodchem
25
40
Activity
60% in Yalama oilfield  
10% in Shah Deniz gas field
oil products transport,
petrol stations
refinery, pertochemicals, tanker terminal, 
heat and power plant, pipelines 
BurgasÐSofia and BurgasÐVarna
petrol stations
oil and gas field ÒKaraczaganakÓ 
development
5% stake in oil field Tengiz; 12,5% stake 
in Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
LUKoil develops oil field Kumkol, Hurrican 
(Canada) is its partner in this project
oil products transport, petrol stations
refining
petrol stations
refining
chemicals and petrochemicals
1300 petrol stations
petrol stations
refinery, tanker terminal in Butinge
engineering group
oil pipeline and distribution system
refining
chemicals
petrochemicals
refining
Table II. Ð Russian oil companies: selected equity investment outside the Russian Federation by mid 2003
Sources: News agencies and oil companiesÕ websites.
C E S  S t u d i e s
Name of the field 
Consortium
Azerbaijan
Azeri, Chirag and
Gunashli (oil)
Azerbaijan International
Operating Company,
AIOC, PSA signed in
1994
Shah Deniz (gas) 
PSA signed in 1996
Yalama 
PSA signed in 1997
BakuÐTbilisiÐCeyhan
Pipeline
Kazakhstan
Karachaganak (oil, gas)
Karachaganak
Integrated Organization
(KIO) 
PSA signed in 1997
Kashagan (oil)
Agip Kazakhstan North
Caspian Operating
Company (Agip KCO),
PSA signed in 1997.
Tengiz (oil)
Joint Venture
TengizChevrOil (TCO)
founded in 1993
Tengiz Ð Novorossiysk
pipeline
Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC)
Partners (% share)
BP Ð operator, 34.1%; Unocal (USA) Ð
10.2%; Impex Co. (Japan) Ð 10%; 
SOCAR Ð10%; Statoil Ð 8.6%;
ExxonMobil Ð 8%; TPAO (Turkey) Ð
6.8%; Devon Energy (USA) Ð 5.6%;
Itochu (Japan) Ð 3.9%; Amerada Hess
(international consortium)Ð 2.7%
BP Ð operator, 25.5%; Statoil Ð 25.5%,
SOCAR Ð 10%; LUKAgip Ð 10%;
TotalFinaElf (France) Ð 10%; 
OIEC (Iran) Ð 10%; TPAO Ð 9%
LUKArco Ð operator, 60%; 
SOCAR Ð 40%
BP 30.1%, SOCAR 25%, Unocal 8.9%,
Statoil 8.7%, TPAO 6.5%, Agip 5%,
TotalFinaElf 5%, Itochu 3.4%, Inpex
2.5%, Phillips 2.5%, AmeradaHess 2.4%
ENI (Agip-Italy) Ð 32.5%; BG Ð 32.5%;
ChevronTexaco Ð 20%; LUKoil Ð 15%
ENI-Agip Ð operator, 16.67%; BG Ð 16.67
(intends to withdraw from the project);
ExxonMobil Ð 16.67%; TotalFinaElf Ð
16.67%; Royal Dutch/Shell Ð 16.67%;
Inpex (Japan) Ð 8.33%, Phillips Ð 8.33%
C h e v r o n Texaco Ð 50%; ExxonMobil Ð 25%,
KazMunaiGaz Ð 20%; LUKArco Ð 5%
Russian government Ð 24%; 
Kazakh government Ð 19%;
C h e v r o n Texaco Ð 15%; LUKArco Ð 12.5%;
Rosneft-Shell Ð7.5%; ExxonMobil Ð 7.5%;
Oman Ð 7%; Agip Ð 2%; BG Ð 2%;
KazMunaiGaz Ð 1.75%; 
Oryx (USA) Ð 1.75%
Additional information: estimated value 
of investment, its schedule, etc.
Growth of production from this field
thanks to foreign investment, peak 
of production projected for the end of this
decade; estimated investment Ð $13 bln
The field has already been explored; 
its development is in progress; 
exploitation due to start around 2006; 
estimated investment: US$ 4.5 billion
US$ 2.5 billion
Pipeline construction is in progress; 
due to be completed in 2004; 
estimated investment: US$ 3 billion
Field already being mined; output due 
to double by the end of this decade; 
estimated investment: 
approx. US$ 15 billion
Oil mining should start in around 2007;
already over US$ 2 billion invested;
investment to absorb another 
US$ 7 billion in 2003Ð2006
Field already being mined; 
output supposed to double by 2010; 
estimated investment: 
approx. US$ 20 billion
Pipeline made available for mining 
in 2002; approx. US$ 2.6 billion invested;
entire estimated investment value, 
including second pipeline: US$ 4 billion
Table III. Ð The largest oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia 
C E S  S t u d i e s
Name of the field 
Consortium
Russia
Kovykta (gas)
Russia Petroleum,
The project is going to
be realised under PSA,
though no agreement has
been signed as of yet 
Chayvo, Odoptu,
Arkutun-Dagi (gas, oil)
Sakhalin Ð 1
PSA signed in 1995.
Piltun-Astokhskoye,
Lunskoye
Sakhalin Ð 2 (oil, gas)
Sakhalin Energy
Investment Co. Ltd.
PSA signed in 1994
Khariag (oil)
PSA signed in 1995.
Shtokman (gas)
Zapolarnoye (gas)
Blue Stream Gas
Pipeline
Baltic Gas Pipeline
Yamal Gas Pipeline 
(second line)
Partners (% share)
BP Ð operator, 31%; Interros (Russia) Ð
24%; Irkutsk Oblast Ð 14%; Vitra
Holdings Co. Ð 13%; Tyumen Oil Ð 18%,
Gazprom strives for being admitted to the
project 
Exxon Neftegaz Ltd. Ð operator, 30%;
SODECO (Japanese consortium) Ð 30%;
Rosneft Ð 20%; ONGC Videsh Ltd. (India)
Ð 20%
Royal Dutch/Shell Ð operator, 62.5%;
Mitsui (Japan) Ð 25%; Mitsubishi Ð
12.5%
TotalFinaElf Ð operator, 50%; Norsk
Hydro Ð 40%; Nenets Oil Company Ð 10%
(the project is due to be joined by LUKoil,
which is to buy 10% from each foreign
investor; transaction formalities are in
process)
Gazprom Ð 50%; Fortum (Finland);
Conoco (USA); TotalFinaElf,
NorwayÕs Norsk Hydro
Gazprom (Royal/Dutch Shell is interested
in participating in the project) 
ENI Ð 50%, Gazprom Ð 50%
Gazprom has signed a preliminary agree-
ment with the Finnish Fortum; Ruhrgas,
Shell and Wintershall are considering
joining the project.
Gazprom, Beltransgaz, EuroPolGaz
Additional information: estimated value 
of investment, its schedule, etc.
A feasibility study (technical and 
economical) of the project due by mid
2004; initial estimated investment:
approx. US$ 12 billion, of which 7 billion
for a gas pipeline going towards Japan 
or China
$ 12 bln projected investment until 2010
($ 1 bln invested until 2001). Production
is to start in 2006
Total cost (est.) $ 10 bln, 
until 2002 over $ 2 bln invested, 
production has started in 1999 
Post-soviet field, rehabilitated right now,
production is going on
Talks on feasibility study,
estimated cost Ð $ 15Ð25 bln 
2001 Ð production has started
until 2002 $ 1 bln invested
$ 3,3 bln, completed in 2002
In 2001 Gazprom released feasibility
study. Estimated investment $ 7Ð8 bln
First pipeline completed in  2001,
Gazprom delays the construction of the
second pipeline (its cost Ð 2 bln USD) 
Table III. Ð The largest oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia  (2)
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Interfax, FSU Energy 2003.
C E S  S t u d i e s
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Former USSR
gas, trillion m3
0 . 8 5
1.84
47.57
2.01
1.12
1.87
55.30
% world
0.5%
1.2%
30.5%
1.3%
0.7%
1.2%
35.4%
oil, billion t
1.00
1.20
8.20
0.10
0.00
0.10
10.60
% world
0.7%
0.9%
5.7%
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
7.5%
Table IV. Ð Natural gas and crude oil reserves in the former USSR area 
Source: www.bp.com, in billion m3
Data in million tons, * Ð estimated volumes 
Source: Oil Information 2003, IEA
production
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Lithuania
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
demand
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
exsports
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
imports
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Lithuania
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
1 9 9 7
9 . 1
1.8
25.8
0.2
303.9
5.5
4.6
8.1
5.6
8.8
8.6
1.7
3.3
121.2
2.7
17.5
7.0
0.4
17.0
126.9
1.4
0.9
10.5
1.7
5.8
4.0
0.5
9.0
1 9 9 8
11.4
1.8
25.9
0.3
301.4
7.3
3.9
8.4
5.9
8.6
8.6
1.6
3.8
118.7
2.6
17.6
7.0
0.4
18.3
137.2
1.6
0.8
10.1
2.2
6.8
5.6
0.9
9.9
1 9 9 9
13.8
1.8
30.1
0.2
303.2
7.7
3.8
8.3
5.6
7.6
6.7
1.6
3.0
120.8
2.9
13.2
6.9
0.4
23.8
134.5
1.5
0.6
9.9
0.7
4.6
4.6
0.6
9.4
2 0 0 0
14.0
1.9
35.3
0.3
321.7
7.7
3.7
7.7
6.3
6.9
7.4
1.3
2.3
125.3
2.9
11.6
6.6
0.4
29.2
144.4
1.5
0.0
12.0
1.0
5.1
5.9
0.6
6.0
2 0 0 1
14.9
1.8
40.1
0.5
345.8
8.6
3.7
7.4
3.8
7.3
8.9
1.5
2.6
125.5
3.8
12.7
6.4
0.4
32.5
162.1
1.5
0
11.9
2.3
6.6
5.1
0.6
13.5
2 0 0 2 *
15.3
1.8
47.1
0.5
378.2
9.7
3.7
7.4
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Table V. Ð Crude oil in the former USSR area Ð selected data 
C E S  S t u d i e s
Data in million tons, * Ð estimated data, 
Source: Oil Information 2003, IEA
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Korea
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
USA
1 9 9 8
2.0
3.2
6.0
4.9
5.7
28.4
1.1
6.1
11.3
0.5
1.4
12.8
0.7
0.0
5.0
2.2
1.9
2.1
0.5
1 9 9 9
1.8
4.5
5.3
5.0
7.6
31.9
0.8
5.8
14.6
0.5
3.2
14.0
0.6
0.0
5.6
2.3
3.2
0.7
1.4
2 0 0 0
2.5
5.4
5.2
4.9
7.9
34.2
4.2
5.8
16.1
1.6
4.5
17.5
0.3
0.0
5.8
1.4
2.5
2.3
0.4
2 0 0 1
1.9
5.1
5.1
4.8
10.1
35.8
5.7
5.6
19.5
2.4
6.8
17.3
1.3
5.4
6.1
1.1
4.8
2.9
0.0
2 0 0 2 *
2.3
9.1
4.6
5.8
14.0
38.5
9.1
5.0
18.7
2.6
7.7
17.2
0.6
5.5
9.2
3.7
3.9
3.9
4.3
Table VI. Ð Oil imports from the former USSR area by OECD countries 
C E S  S t u d i e s
Production
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Consumption
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldavia
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Exports
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Imports
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldavia
Russia
Tajikistan
Ukraine
1 9 9 7
6.0
0.2
8.1
570.5
17.3
18.1
48.8
1.4
6.0
16.6
0.8
0.9
8.7
0.9
1.3
2.5
3.7
380.9
0.8
11.4
79.1
41.8
2.4
200.9
5.9
11.4
9.9
1.4
0.0
16.2
0.8
0.9
3.0
0.8
1.3
2.5
3.7
4.5
0.7
62.4
1 9 9 8
5.8
0.3
7.9
590.7
13.3
18.0
54.8
1.5
5.7
16.3
0.7
0.8
8.7
1.0
1.3
2.2
3.3
384.9
0.8
10.8
70.9
50.3
2.3
203.4
2.9
0.6
4.5
1.5
0.0
16.0
0.7
0.8
3.1
1.0
1.4
2.2
3.3
3.0
0.8
53.5
1 9 9 9
6.2
0.3
10.3
590.8
22.9
18.1
55.6
1.2
6.3
16.8
0.7
0.9
8.4
0.6
1.2
2.3
2.9
392.4
0.8
13.2
76.9
51.0
4.2
205.4
9.7
1.1
4.5
1.2
0.0
16.6
0.7
0.9
2.8
0.6
1.3
2.3
2.9
4.1
0.7
59.9
2 0 0 0
5.8
0.3
12.0
582.7
47.2
18.1
56.4
1.4
6.2
17.2
0.8
1.0
10.5
0.7
1.4
2.6
2.5
394.9
0.8
13.5
76.9
50.8
5.2
193.9
33.7
1.1
5.6
1.4
0.3
17.1
0.8
1.0
4.2
0.7
1.4
2.6
2.5
13.0
0.7
59.9
2 0 0 1
5.5
0.3
11.6
580.3
51.6
18.3
57.4
1.4
8.9
17.4
0.9
1.2
10.3
0.7
1.6
2.7
2.7
405.8
0.6
14.2
74.3
51.7
5.5
180.9
37.4
1.0
5.7
1.4
3.3
17.3
0.9
0.9
4.3
0.7
1.4
2.7
2.7
4.1
0.6
56.9
2 0 0 2 *
5.2
0.3
11.2
595
53.8
18.8
57.4
1.1
8.4
16.8
0.7
0.8
9.9
0.6
1.6
2.7
9.0
415.0
0.5
14.4
73.4
52.1
5.5
190.0
39.4
1.0
4.6
1.1
3.2
16.6
0.7
0.8
4.2
0.6
1.4
2.7
9.6
5.0
0.5
55.5
Table VII. Ð Natural gas in the former USSR area Ð selected data 
Data in billion m3, * Ð estimated volumes, Source: Natural Gas Information 2003, IEA
C E S  S t u d i e s
Czech Republic
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Poland
Turkey
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
Serbia and Montenegro
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldavia
Ukraine
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Russia
Iran
Ru s s i a
7.1
4.5
10.9
33.3
1.6
9.6
18.9
4.7
11.6
3.3
3.6
7.3
1.1
1.0
1.8
1.1
0.0
16.6
0.7
0.8
1.4
2.7
9.6
29.0
0
0
0
0
Tu r k m e n i s t a n
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
25.3
0
0
0
5.1
U z b e k i s t a n
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.6
0.5
0
0
0
K a z a k h s t a n
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0
0
Table VIII. Ð Gas imports from the former USSR area by European countries, 2002 
Data in billion m3, * Ð estimated volumes
Source: Natural Gas Information 2003, IEA
